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BUYING TIME FOR SURVIVORS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PROPOSAL
FOR IMPLEMENTING AN EXCEPTION
TO WELFARE TIME LIMITS
JENNIFER M. MASON*
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996' (Personal Responsibility Act),
states have unprecedented discretion in fashioning their social welfare
programs. The Personal Responsibility Act eliminated the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children2 (AFDC) program and replaced it
with block grants for states to use in designing their own assistance
programs. 3 States therefore have a substantial opportunity to impact
the lives of America's poorest families. The Act, however, imposes
some restrictions on the states as a condition for receiving the money.
Particularly notable is the Act's prohibition on state provision of ben-
efits to any family that includes an adult who has received assistance
for sixty months over her4 lifetime.5 The Personal Responsibility Act
also contains guidelines that are merely discretionary on the part of
the states. This Note discusses two such options, both exceptions to
the sixty-month rule. First, the Act allows a state to exempt a family
from the sixty-month limitation "by reason of hardship or if the family
includes an individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme
* My sincere thanks go to Professor Helen Hershkoff for her generous and invaluable
guidance, to Aimee Pollak and Lisa Kramer for their thoughtful editing, and especially to
my parents for their constant love and support. I dedicate this Note to the staff of the West
Women's and Children's Shelter in Portland, Oregon.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7,29, 42 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act].
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-87 (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 601-87 (West Supp. 1997).
3 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a) (West Supp. 1997).
4 This Note uses feminine pronouns to refer both to adult welfare recipients and survi-
vors of domestic violence because women form the overwhelming majority of each cate-
gory. See V. Michael McKenzie, Domestic Violence in America 9 (1995) (noting that 95%
to 98% of battering cases involve men attacking women); infra note 14 and accompanying
text (stating that adult AFDC recipients were typically mothers).
5 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1997) ("A
State to which a grant is made... shall not use any part of the grant to provide assistance
to a family that includes an adult who has received assistance under any State program
funded under this part... for 60 months (whether or not consecutive) .....
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cruelty."' 6 Second, the Act allows a state to waive time limits where
the family includes an individual who has been victimized by or is at
risk of domestic violence.7
This opportunity for states to create a waiver for welfare time
limits raises challenging questions. States must decide whether to pur-
sue such an option, taking into account questions about the incentives
such a program will create for welfare recipients. Furthermore, states
must confront the gender issues inherent in an exception targeted at
survivors of domestic violence.8 States that do create such an excep-
tion then must design an administrative structure to implement it.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the AFDC program
and the demographics of the population it served. It then examines
the Personal Responsibility Act, focusing specifically on the statutory
language and history of the sixty-month time limit on receipt of bene-
fits and the two optional exceptions states may enact. This examina-
tion reveals that the Act contemplates that states have both the power
and the support of Congress and the Department of Health and
Human Services to implement exceptions for the benefit of survivors
of domestic violence. 9
Given that states may choose to assist survivors of domestic vio-
lence by waiving time limits, Part II asks the normative question:
Should states do so? After describing the nature of domestic violence
in Part II.A.1, Part II.A.2 examines the manner in which it can under-
mine the ability of a woman to enter the workforce successfully and
permanently. Because domestic violence is particularly pervasive in
the lives of welfare recipients, Part II.A.3 concludes that it is appropri-
ate for states to prioritize allocations to survivors of such violence in
defining available exceptions. Part II.B. then attempts to locate wel-
fare time limits and an exception for battered women in the broader
context of the welfare debate. It explores first whether exempting
survivors of domestic violence from time limits is consistent with the
overall goals and incentives of the Personal Responsibility Act. It
6 Id. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i).
7 See id. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii).
8 See supra note 4 (noting that primarily women receive welfare benefits as adults and
face domestic violence). Also, this Note uses the term "survivor" rather than "victim" to
refer both to women who are currently being abused and who have been abused in the
past.
9 The focus of this Note is on exceptions that states grant-under the rubric of either
the Hardship Exception or Family Violence Option-based on the petitioner's having been
"battered or subjected to extreme cruelty." While the language of the Act indicates that
states may grant a hardship exception on the basis of a claim of "hardship" unconnected
with family violence, it is beyond the scope of this Note to examine in detail at whom such
an exception should be targeted and how such an exception would be implemented. For a
brief discussion of what may constitute "hardship," see infra note 62.
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then examines two potential problems with such an exception to time
limits, but concludes that an exception for battered women does not
necessarily reinforce categorical judgments about recipients of welfare
or discourage debate over structural causes of welfare dependency.
Having concluded that states can and should implement excep-
tions to benefit survivors of domestic violence, this Note then explores
how they should do so. Part III.A. examines the interests of potential
petitioners and states in the design of a system that will administer an
exception to welfare time limits. Because one key state interest will
be an easy and efficient transition, states should draw from already
existing procedures to the greatest extent possible in implementing
their exceptions. Part III.B. then identifies two procedures-the
AFDC's good cause exception to paternity determination cooperation
requirements and self-petitioning procedures under the Violence
Against Women Act for battered immigrant women-to which states
can look in creating their own systems. After outlining the key fea-
tures of both procedures, Part III.C. draws on their strengths and of-
fers a specific proposal for implementing exceptions to welfare time
limits.
I
THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
RECONCILIATION Acr OF 1996: TIME-LIMITED ASSISTANCE
AND ITS RELATION TO Do iSric VIOLENCE
A. Overview of AFDC and the Personal Responsibility Act
The Personal Responsibility Act establishes the federal govern-
ment's most recent program to provide financial assistance to needy
families. This commitment began in 1935 with the creation of the Aid
to Dependent Children program,10 which provided financial support
to children whose fathers were dead or had deserted the family." In
1962, the scope of the program expanded and its name was changed to
Aid to Families with Dependent Children.' 2 Between 1962 and 1996,
when the Personal Responsibility Act was passed, AFDC extended
aid to all poor children and their caretakers,U allowing one relative-
10 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, 49 Stat. 620, 627-629 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-687 (West Supp. 1997)).
11 See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor 5 (1997) (outlining
history of AFDC).
12 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172, amended by
Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-687 (West Supp. 1997).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 602 (West Supp. 1997); Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 5.
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usually the child's mother14-to receive AFDC benefits as the child's
caretaker 15 until the child turned eighteen.'
6
AFDC was administered on a state level, and states retained dis-
cretion to define need, set benefit levels, and set income limits.
17 Op-
erated under the theory of cooperative federalism, the federal
government provided the majority of the funds for the program and
retained the power to impose certain requirements on the states. For
example, states that accepted federal funds had to provide aid to all
eligible families in a reasonably prompt manner,'8 assure that funds
were used to further the best interests of the child,19 and provide for a
birth control program to reduce out-of-wedlock births.20 States also
were required to apply their need standards uniformly and provide aid
to all persons eligible under federal and state limits.2' States were not
required, however, to make payments equal to their need standard,
22
and, as a consequence, welfare benefits fell below the poverty level in
every state.23
Total enrollment in AFDC rose sharply beginning in 1989.24 By
1992, one in seven children lived in a household that participated in
the program. 5 At the height of the AFDC program in 1994, over 14.2
14 See Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass
3 (1992) (noting that AFDC served primarily unwed, separated, and divorced mothers).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 606 (West Supp. 1997) (discussing who may receive payments).
16 See id. § 606(a), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 606 (West
Supp. 1997) (defining "dependent child"); see also Staff of House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 1996 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Pro-
grams Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 385 (Comm. Print
1996) [hereinafter 1996 Green Book] (discussing basic rules of AFDC program and chart-
ing demographics).
17 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 384.
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 602 (West Supp. 1997).
19 See id. § 605, amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West
Supp. 1997).
20 See id. § 602(a)(15), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602
(West Supp. 1997).
21 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 384.
22 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(ii) (1997); see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413
(1970) (holding that states may make payments lower than calculated standard of need in
order to "accomodate budgetary realities").
23 See Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Welfare Law Developments, 26
Clearinghouse Rev. 1175, 1179 (1993) (observing that assistance available from AFDC and
food stamps combined was below poverty level in every state and below 75% of poverty
level in 41 states).
24 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 466-67 tbl.8-25 (finding that between 1989
and 1992, approximately one million families (2.7 million people) entered AFDC
program).
25 See id. at 466.
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million people (9.6 million children) in five million families received
$22.8 billion in AFDC benefits. 6 In that same year, almost half
(46.4%) of AFDC households included a nonrecipient.2 7
The statistics of AFDC enrollment paint a complex and some-
times contradictory picture of the characteristics of those who receive
government assistance, especially when compared to the stereotypical
welfare family. 8 In 1994, almost 73% of all AFDC families had only
one or two children.29 Only 10% of AFDC families had four or more
children.30 The average AFDC family size was 2.8 persons in 1994,
the lowest since 1969.31 The racial composition of AFDC recipients
was quite varied, although minorities were represented in dispropor-
tionately high numbers relative to their presence in the general popu-
lation. In 1994,37% of recipients were white, 36% African American,
20% Latina, 3% Asian American, and 1% Native American.32 Al-
most 56% of children receiving AFDC lived with a parent who was
26 See id. at 459 tbl.8-22 (charting total federal and state AFDC expenditures); id. at
467 (charting trends in AFDC enrollment). The federal government has estimated that in
1996, 4.6 million families-13 million people, including 8.8 million children-received wel-
fare in an average month. See id. at 467. Note that the total federal and state spending on
AFDC-$22.8 billion annually-is $128 billion less than the federal government spent on
the savings and loan bailout. See Charles Sennott, Liberals Finding the Aid System is
Broken, Boston Globe, May 17,1994, at 1; see also Joel F. Handler, Two Years and You're
Out, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 865 (1994) (comparing total federal and state budget for AFDC
with that for health care (approximately $900 billion annually)).
27 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 474 tbL8-28; id. at 475 (grouping AFDC
recipients by various characteristics). The identity of the other household occupants is
unclear. While it could be that women and children receiving welfare money are living
with family members, many could also be living with abusive men, which might explain in
part the prevalence of domestic violence in the lives of welfare recipients. See generally
infra Part ILA3.
28 See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
29 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 473 tbL-28.
30 See id.; Marion Buckley, Eliminating the Per-Child Allotment in the AFDC Pro-
gram, 13 Law & Ineq. J. 169, 182 (1994) (outlining characteristics of AFDC recipients).
31 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 473 tbi8-28. These statistics indicate that
the welfare mother who has a disproportionately high number of children in order to re-
ceive higher AFDC payments is largely a creature of myth. See Handier, supra note 26, at
861 (enumerating myths about welfare mothers and commenting that "[t]he image that
most Americans have of welfare families is largely disconnected from reality"). Indeed,
studies have demonstrated that the decisions of AFDC recipients to have children are
based not on the desire for a bigger benefit check, but on "psychosocial" factors such as
emotional immaturity, lack of self-esteem, and desire to escape abusive homes. See Buck-
ley, supra note 30, at 183 n.87 (citing studies). But see Charles Murray, Redefinition of
Rights: Its Deforming Effect on Communities, 1 Mich. L & Po'y Rev. 291,294-95 (1996)
(arguing that single, poor women have children because social welfare system has de-
stroyed economic incentives and social attitudes that would counsel to contrary).
32 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 474 tbl.8-28. This statistic contradicts the
perception that most welfare recipients are African American. See Handler, supra note 26,
at 871.
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never married.33 Most mothers receiving welfare, 69%, were over the
age of twenty-five. 3
4
While the majority of AFDC recipients generally left the pro-
gram within twelve months,35 many later returned, indicating that wel-
fare recipients often cycled on and off welfare. 36 Approximately 50%
of welfare recipients, however, received AFDC for no more than four
years over the course of their lives.37
Welfare reform came to the forefront of national debate during
the 1992 presidential campaign. Indeed, during his campaign, then-
Governor Clinton coined the slogan that the country must "put an end
to welfare as we know it.' '38 When the 104th Congress entered office
in November 1994, one of its top priorities was to overhaul the welfare
system.39
The impetus to overhaul welfare came primarily from a belief
that AFDC had failed in its mission and instead had fostered stagna-
tion and dependency. Invoking statistics on the number of children
33 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 473 tbl.8-28 (evaluating basis for eligibility).
These data indicate that the perception that welfare payments went largely to unwed
mothers and their children was based on reality.
34 See id. Only 6.3% of welfare mothers were under age 20 in 1994. See id. This
statistic rebuts the common impression that welfare mothers are largely teenage mothers.
See Handler, supra note 26, at 861.
35 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 500 (noting that "[t]he question of how long
families receive AFDC has more than one answer. The answer is affected by characteris-
tics of the parent, whether repeat episodes of enrollment are taken into account, and
whether annual or monthly data are examined."); id. at 502-03 tbl.8-43 (showing that 56%
of AFDC episodes end within 12 months); see also Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at
6 (claiming that 48% of people receive benefits for under two years).
36 See 1996 Green Book, supra note 16, at 502-03 tbl.8-43 (estimating that 45% of for-
mer recipients return to AFDC within one year of exiting, 58% return within two years,
and 69% within four years). At least part of this cycling can be attributed to part-time and
seasonal employment opportunities.
37 See id. at 505 (noting that "a significant percent of all persons on welfare will be
enrolled for less than 2 years (30 percent) or less than 4 years (50 percent)"); see also
Adele M. Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC Program Rules for Advocates: An Overview,
27 Clearinghouse Rev. 1164, 1166 (1994) (characterizing AFDC recipients); Handler, supra
note 26, at 861 (contrasting statistics with stereotype of long-term dependency and com-
menting that "[tihe essential point is that the vast majority of welfare mothers are adults
who have no problem with the work ethic although, understandably, they have lots of
problems getting good enough jobs"). Studies indicated that between 17% and 30% of
AFDC recipients remained in the program for over eight years. Compare Hershkoff &
Loffredo, supra note 11, at 6 (claiming that 17% of recipients remained for eight or more
years), with Buckley, supra note 30, at 181-82 n.75 (estimating 30%).
38 Michael Shanahan, Welfare: Bush grabs old campaign issue, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, Apr. 25, 1992, at All.
39 See Richard Lacayo, Down on the Downtrodden, Time, Dec. 19, 1994, at 30, 32
(noting that goal of overhauling welfare system was prominent feature of House G.O.P.'s
"Contract with America").
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receiving AFDC benefits,4 the rate of teenage and out-of-wedlock
pregnancies, 41 and the correlation between single-parent families and
poverty,42 Congress abolished the AFDC program and enacted the
Personal Responsibility Act43 in its place, returning the locus of wel-
fare planning to the states.44
There are three primary differences between the regime set up
under AFDC and that under the Personal Responsibility AcL45 First,
AFDC was an entitlement program in which the federal government
guaranteed benefits to all eligible families that applied, while the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act explicitly provides that no individual or fam-
ily is entitled to any assistance under any state program.46 Second,
AFDC guaranteed the availability of funds, allowing for flexibility in
times of economic recession, while the Personal Responsibility Act
involves fixed block grants that are not variable.47 Third, AFDC in-
volved a matching fund program that encouraged states to spend their
own money on programs for needy families, while each block grant
under the Personal Responsibility Act is a fixed sum, providing no
incentive for states to spend their own money on the poor.48
40 The numbers grew from 33 million in 1965 to 93 million in 1992. See Personal
Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 note (listing legislative findings) (West Supp. 199).
41 Overall out-of-wedlock pregnancy grew by 14% between 1980 and 1991. Teenage
out-of-wedlock pregnancy increased by 23% between 1976 and 1991. However, the
number of married pregnancies dropped 73% between 1980 and 1991. See id. § 601 note
(listing legislative findings).
42 While 46% of single-mother families live below the national poverty line, only 9% of
married-couple families live in poverty. See id. (listing legislative findings).
43 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 29, 42 U.S.C.A.).
44 There were, however, critics who argued that the welfare reform movement focused
on incorrect assumptions about the stereotypical welfare mother, see supra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text (discussing demographics of welfare recipients), and "reduced the en-
tire poverty debate to the AFDC program," Lucy A. Wiliams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 Yale LJ. 719,744 (1992); see also
infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text (reviewing theories of welfare dependency and
poverty).
45 See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 34-35 (enumerating and anal)zing
differences).
46 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(b) (West Supp. 1997) ("No indi-
vidual entitlement.-This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any State program funded under this part.").
47 See id. § 603(a). Commentators suspect that the contingency fund set up by the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act will not be sufficient to meet national crises. See Hershkoff &
Loffredo, supra note 11, at 36 (citing Center for Budget and Policy Priorities prediction
that "the 'contingency fund is almost certain to run out part way through the next
recession'").
48 See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 35. Indeed, the Personal Responsibility
Act allows states to use up to 30% of their grant for social programs that do not necessarily
provide actual benefits. See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 604(d) (West
Supp. 1997).
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Also unlike AFDC, the Personal Responsibility Act provides ex-
plicit goals.49 These goals include the provision of assistance to needy
families so that children may be cared for in their own homes; the end
of dependence by needy parents on government benefits; the promo-
tion of job preparation, work, and marriage; the prevention and re-
duction of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and the encouragement of
two-parent families.50 To meet these goals, the Personal Responsibil-
ity Act offers block grants to states that develop assistance plans for
needy children and families, discourage poor women from having chil-
dren out of wedlock, and establish programs to encourage employ-
ment and self-sufficiency among benefit recipients.51 This new system
is decentralized, allowing programs to "differ from city to city and
state to state in terms of type of benefits, eligibility, application
processes, and reporting requirements. '52
While a hallmark of the Personal Responsibility Act is the flexi-
bility it affords to states to design their own programs,53 it does im-
pose some general guidelines deemed to be essential to the ends
sought. The Personal Responsibility Act mandates that states receiv-
ing grant funds require that parents or caretakers who receive assist-
ance engage in work within twenty-four months of the first benefit
received.54 The Act also requires each state to achieve minimum
work participation rates: twenty-five percent of all two-parent fami-
lies receiving assistance must be working by the end of 1997 and fifty
percent by 2002.55 To ensure compliance, the federal government will
reduce the block grant of any state that does not meet its work partici-
49 In contrast, the legislation establishing AFDC contained no precise language stating
the program's aims.
50 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a) (West Supp. 1997). Some
commentators have noted that the goals of helping eligible mothers achieve self-sufficiency
and providing a minimal standard of living for poor children may be contradictory at times
and may argue for inapposite policy choices at some junctures. See Robert L. Tsai, Book
Note, The System Worked: Our Schizophrenic Stance on Welfare, 106 Yale L.J. 929, 932
(1996) (noting that people are profoundly divided over goals of welfare).
51 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (West Supp. 1997) (outlining
elements of Family Assistance Program required of all participating states).
52 Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 33.
53 The Act devolves responsibility for welfare policy to the state level under the prem-
ise that states can deliver more creative, efficient, and effective aid to the poor. See
George Rodrigue, Budget Battle is about Vision, Analysts agree. They Say Rich vs. Poor is
Key Issue, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 7, 1996, at 1A, available in 1996 WL 2094882 (recit-
ing argument for locating welfare planning in states).
54 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
The imposition of work requirements as a condition of welfare is not a new concept, but
has existed since the advent of AFDC. See Handler, supra note 26, at 859.
55 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 607(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (impos-
ing minimum participation rates for all families); id. § 607(a)(2) (imposing minimum par-
ticipation rates for two-parent families). By the end of 1997, many states realized that they
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pation rates.56 The Act also gives states some discretion to impose
financial penalties on families containing an individual who vill not
engage in work.57
B. The Personal Responsibility Act's Sixty-Month Limitation
and Exceptions
1. Statutory Language
A key provision of the Personal Responsibility Act is that no
state may "provide assistance to a family that includes an adult who
has received assistance under any State program funded under this
part... for 60 months (whether or not consecutive)." s58 This change is
a significant break from former welfare policy.5 9 The Personal Re-
sponsibility Act, however, allows states at their discretion to enact two
exceptions to this otherwise strict five-year time limit.60
A state's first option is to enact a Hardship Exception: "The
State may exempt a family from [the sixty-month limitation] by reason
of hardship or if the family includes an individual who has been bat-
tered or subjected to extreme cruelty." 61 The Hardship Exception
leaves "hardship" undefined,62 but defines "battered or subject to ex-
treme cruelty" as the subjection of an individual to
would fall short of their participation rates for two-parent families. See Jason DeParle,
Half the States Unlikely to Meet Goals on Welfare, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al.
56 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 609(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (provid-
ing for grant reductions of 5% to 21%).
57 See id. § 607(e)(1) (allowing state to reduce or terminate assistance). But cf. id.
§ 607(c)(2)(C) (deeming satisfactory school attendance by teen head of household as work
participation); id. § 607(e)(2) (prohibiting state from reducing assistance where individual
who refuses to work is single custodial parent of child under age six and is unable to obtain
needed child care).
58 Id. § 608(a)(7)(A). States are free to impose even shorter time limits on the receipt
of benefits. See Hershkoff & Lofredo, supra note 11, at 47 (noting that sixty-month limit
on benefits is cap).
59 Under AFDC, the duration of benefits was limited only by the recipient child's age.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
60 The focus of this Note is on states that opt to implement these exceptions. While
there is an ongoing debate regarding the wisdom and efficacy of time-limited welfare bene-
fits in general, it is beyond the scope of this Note to explore this question in depth.
61 Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1997).
62 Two early drafts of the Personal Responsibility Act may provide some insight as to
the meaning of "hardship." H.R. 2903, 104th Cong. § 402(c)(1)(B) (1996) and S. 1841,
104th Cong. § 401(c)(2)(B)(i) (1996) provided an exception for families meeting one of
three criteria: families in which one adult was working part-time, families residing in high
unemployment areas, or families experiencing "other special hardship circumstances."
Other possible "hardship" cases include people with such low skill levels that they are
unable to work, people caring for disabled children, or people living in areas vth high
unemployment. See Barbara Vobejda, New twist for welfare law. Domestic violence, Sun-
day Star-Ledger (Newark, NJ.), Apr. 13, 1997, at 24.
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(I) physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in, physical
injury to the individual;
(II) sexual abuse;
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child;
(IV) being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child to
engage in nonconsensual sexual acts or activities;
(V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
(VI) mental abuse; or
(VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care.
63
If a state does choose to enact the Hardship Exception, however, it
may exempt at most twenty percent of the average monthly number of
families to which the state provides benefits.6a
A state's second option-the Family Violence Option65--is to
waive, pursuant to a determination of good cause.... program re-
quirements such as time limits (for so long as necessary) for individ-
63 Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii) (West Supp. 1997). The
definition of "battered or subject to extreme cruelty" is ambiguous in a number of ways.
First, it does not define the relationship between the perpetrator and victim. The excep-
tion thus could extend beyond intra-family violence to include survivors of assault by a
stranger, of stranger or acquaintance rape, and even of severe sexual harassment in the
workplace. Leaving the definition open in this way might reflect an understanding that
many types of violence negatively impact a person's ability to participate successfully in the
workplace. This Note argues, however, that because domestic violence is so prevalent in
the lives of recipients of welfare and because it may have such a devastating impact on
their ability to enter the workforce successfully, it would be appropriate for states to target
exceptions at parents who struggle with domestic violence. See infra Part II.A.
Second, the definition does not specify whether the alleged violence must have a di-
rect link to the adult petitioner's inability to enter the workforce successfully. This Note
argues that in light of the language of another provision of the Personal Responsibility
Act-the Family Violence Option-which explicitly ties exceptions to violence, see infra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text, and the debilitating nature of domestic violence, see
infra Part II.A.2, the target recipient of any exception to welfare time limits should be a
parent whose inability to enter the workforce successfully is related directly to domestic
violence.
Third, the text of both the Hardship Exception and the Family Violence Option would
permit states to give an exception when the victim of abuse is the child, not the parent.
Indeed, the parent of an abused child may need or want to delay entering the workforce
for the safety and welfare of the child, and in some instances should be given that opportu-
nity. However, a full analysis of the need for, and possible implementation of, such excep-
tions is beyond the scope of this Note, although in general, states will want to ensure that
such exceptions are not granted to parents who played a role in abusing the child.
64 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
65 Id. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii). While the Personal Responsibility Act does not entitle this
provision the "Family Violence Option," it is commonly known by this name. See A Bill
To clarify the family violence option under the temporary assistance to needy families pro-
gram, S. 671, 105th Cong. (1997) (using title "family violence option"); U.S. Government
Press Release, Wellstone, Murray, Activists and Survivors of Domestic Violence Hold
Press Conference to Introduce Bill to Clarify Impact of Welfare Bill on Victims of Domes-
tic Abuse, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4432154 [hereinafter Press Release, Family
Violence Option Clarification Bill] (terming this provision "Family Violence Option").
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uals receiving assistane ... in cases where compliance with such
requirements would make it more difficult for individuals receiving
assistance ... to escape domestic violence or unfairly penalize such
individuals who are or have been victimized by such violence, or
individuals who are at risk of further domestic violence. 66
Unlike the Hardship Exception, the Family Violence Option provides
that a waiver of time limits must be part of a broader program target-
ing survivors of domestic violence: A state that pursues this option
must also "screen and identify individuals... with a history of domes-
tic violence while maintaining the confidentiality of such individu-
als," 67 and "refer such individuals to counseling and supportive
services."68 The section defines "domestic violence" as having the
"same meaning as the term 'battered or subjected to extreme cru-
elty"' 69 as set forth in the Hardship Exception.70
The relationship between the Hardship Exception and Family Vi-
olence Option is not clear from the text of the Personal Responsibility
Act. While their potential recipients overlap, the Act does not tell
states whether the two provisions are meant to be independent and
complementary or whether the Family Violence Option should be
read in a limited manner as a subset of the Hardship Exception, sub-
ject to the latter's twenty percent cap.
71
2. Statutory History and Intent
Both a sixty-month limitation on the receipt of benefits and an
optional exception for hardship were present in almost every welfare
reform proposal considered by the 104th Congress.72 Though the
66 Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
States also have the option of waiving residency requirements, child support coopzration
requirements, and family cap provisions. See id. Note that neither this provision nor the
Hardship Exception requires that "battery" or "extreme cruelty" have occurred during the
60 months in which the petitioner's family received benefits. This omission vill allow
states to give an exemption to a parent who, for example, experienced massive abuse as a
child and continues to be debilitated.
67 Id § 602(a)(7)(A)(i).
68 Id. § 602(a)(7)(A)(ii).
69 Id. § 602(a)(7)(B).
70 It is notable that while domestic violence is usually thought of as violence between
co-habiting family members (i.e., spousal abuse or child abuse), its definition in the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act is not so limited. Thus, the ex'pansive language of the Hardship
Exception and, by extension, the Family Violence Option, indicates that time vaivers
should be available where violence, such as child sexual abuse, is perpetrated by non-resi-
dent family members or family friends.
71 For a discussion of states' concerns, see infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 88-91, 97-103 and accompanying text (describing proposals where states will not
be penalized for granting exceptions for survivors of domestic violence).
72 Compare, e.g., A Bill To restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control
welfare spending, and reduce welfare dependence, H.R. 4, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing
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framers of the Personal Responsibility Act viewed strict time limits as
a pillar of their welfare reform strategy,73 they also recognized that
states should have flexibility to exempt hard cases from those limits.
The conference report reflects this compromise, explaining that "[t]he
legislation assures that welfare will be a helping hand, not a lifetime
handout, by imposing a 5-year lifetime limit on benefits (although as
many as 20 percent of families may be allowed exceptions for condi-
tions of hardship)." 74
Though this report also notes that "[s]tates are not required to
exempt these persons, '' 75 many congressional representatives seemed
to assume that states would implement some type of hardship excep-
tion. Indeed, during congressional debates, proponents of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act's time limits frequently justified the rigidity
of those limits by invoking the Hardship Exception as insurance that
those unable to work would not be abandoned. 76 A conference com-
mittee that approved mandatory time limits and an optional exception
commented that "[t]he legislation does not abandon those Americans
who truly need a helping hand. It retains protections for those who
experience genuine and intractable hardship. '77
no exception), with H.R. 1157, 104th Cong. § 405(a)(6)(B) (1995) (allowing exceptions "by
reason of hardship").
73 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 262 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2649, 2650 (stating that welfare reform strategy rested on following five principles: "Wel-
fare Should Not Be a Way of Life," "Work, Not Welfare," "No More Welfare for Nonci-
tizens and Felons," "Power and Flexibility to the States," and "Encouraging Personal
Responsibility to Halt Rising Illegitimacy Rates").
74 Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-81, pt. 1, at 6 (1995) ("Destroying the narcotic effect
of welfare while preserving its function as a safety net for families experiencing temporary
financial problems is the major intent of the Committee bill. Based on the fact that it is
precisely the permanent guarantee of benefits that induces dependency, the Committee
fundamentally alters the nature of the AFDC program by making its benefits temporary
and provisional.").
75 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 288 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649,
2676.
76 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S8077 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Santorum) ("The Senator [D'Amato] from New York said we are going to put these rigid
time limits on people of 2 years, and after 5 years no more benefits. The Senator from New
York knows very well within this bill there is what is called a hardship exception. What the
State can do is exempt 20 percent, 20 percent of the people in this program from the time
limit."); id. at S9398 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("Five years of
benefits allow adequate time for most people to get their feet under them and get back on
the road to supporting themselves. But even after 5 years the line is not a hard and fast
one. There can be exceptions. The bill allows a 20 percent hardship exemption for the
really difficult cases. So even though we say '5 years and you're off,' even then there's
some leeway.").
77 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 261 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649,
2649.
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Though a hardship exception was included in every proposal, it
came in a variety of forms. After debating variations on the theme,
Congress adopted a permissively worded, optional time limit excep-
tion,78 allowing states to give a limited number of exemptions79 to in-
dividuals who have already received benefits for sixty monthsEO on the
basis of hardship or battery/extreme cruelty.8 1
The Family Violence Option, 2 on the other hand, was not in-
cluded in most drafts of what became the Personal Responsibility Act,
but instead was added at the last minute by Senators Paul Wellstone
and Patty Murray.8 According to its proponents, the provision "was
intended to give states the ability to grant temporary waivers from
certain work requirements for abuse survivors to insure that their
78 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1997)
(providing that states "may" provide exception). Both the House and Senate considered
versions of the bill that required states to implement a hardship exception. See H.R. 2903,
104th Cong. § 402(c)(1)(B) (1996) (using word "shall"); S. 1841, 104th Cong.
§ 402(c)(2)(B) (1996) (stating that "the State plan shall provide for hardship exceptions").
79 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 60S(a)(7)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1997)
(capping number of exceptions at 20% of caseload). The 20% limitation grew from prior
proposals of 10%, see H.R. 1157, 104th Cong. § 405(a)(6)(B)(ii) (1995), and 15%, see H.R.
2903 § 402(c)(1)(B)(iii) (1996). The Department of Health and Human Services estimated
that each five percent increase could translate into benefits for up to 500,000 children. See
141 Cong. Rec. S19,167 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
so See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). One
proposal envisioned a hardship exception to be invoked on an as-needed basis to keep the
month in which the exception was claimed from counting toward the sixty-month total.
See E.R. 2903, 104th Cong. § 402(c)(1)(B) (1996) (stating that "the State plan shall not
include in the determination of the 60-month period.., any month in which... the family
is experiencing other special hardship circumstances which make it appropriate for the
State to provide an exemption for such month"); see also NOW Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Sample Outline of Comment on Federal Family Violence Option Regulations 6
(1997) [hereinafter NOW LDEF Sample Comment] (advocating exceptions that would
"stop the clock" during recipient's stay on welfare).
81 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1997).
The language of "battery or extreme cruelty" was not always included in the text of the
exception. Some early drafts used just the word "hardship" to describe the circumstances
creating eligibility for the exception. See, e.g., H.R. 1157, 104th Cong. § 405(a)(6)(B)(i)
(1995) (exempting family "by reason of hardship").
82 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
83 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Welfare's Domestic Violence, The Nation, Mar. 10, 1997,
at 21 (giving history of Family Violence Option). The provision was drafted by Martha
Davis, Legal Director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Joan Meier,
Professor at George Washington School of Law. See Felicia Kornbluh, Feminists and the
Welfare Debate: Too Little? Too Late?, Dollars & Sense, Nov.Dec. 1996, at 24,39 (not-
ing that "[fleminists and liberals did win an amendment in the welfare law that provides
some buffer for women who have been physically abused"). As originally proposed, the
provision would have required states both to establish procedures to identify survivors of
domestic violence and to waive time limits. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 267
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2655 (recording Senate amendment to list of
required state certifications and conference agreement that family violence option instead
would be included as state option).
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transition to employment is a permanent one."84 Senator Wellstone
said, "Make no mistake-work is the goal, we want to give these
women the support to get there and stay there.
85
As noted above, the relationship between the Family Violence
Option and the Hardship Exception is unclear. Of most concern is the
relationship between the Family Violence Option and the twenty per-
cent cap on exceptions in the Hardship Exception. States wanting to
incorporate family violence programs into their welfare regimes 86 may
have concerns that exempting survivors of domestic violence from
time limits would leave no exceptions available to other types of hard-
ship cases. The states also may fear that giving either type of excep-
tion will result in reductions in the amount of their block grants
because of failure to meet their work participation requirements.8 7
A bill introduced by Senators Wellstone and Murray and a rule
recently proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) both suggest that the federal government does not intend to
penalize states that grant exceptions for survivors of domestic vio-
lence. Senators Wellstone and Murray have drafted a bill that would
clarify the Family Violence Option.8 8 The bill states that it is Con-
gress's intent to allow states to waive time limits and work require-
ments temporarily for victims of domestic violence. 89 It further would
amend the Personal Responsibility Act to provide that states will not
84 Press Release, Family Violence Option Clarification Bill, supra note 65. A group of
36 congressional representatives, recognizing that domestic violence can be a major factor
in the ability of welfare recipients to find and keep jobs, signed a resolution calling for,
among other things, the states to toll time limits for recipients of benefits who are survivors
of domestic violence. See H.R. Con. Res. 195, 104th Cong. 4 (1996) (enacted); see also
Carolyn Skorneck, Lawmakers reject time limits on welfare for domestic violence victims,
Associated Press, July 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4877208 (reporting statement by
Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard that "the provision has always been intended and described as
an additional exemption, and as such got the unanimous support of the House Budget
Committee").
85 Press Release, Family Violence Option Clarification Bill, supra note 65.
86 See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing which states have adopted
Family Violence Option or similar provision).
87 See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed Rule, 62
Fed. Reg. 62,124,62,128 (1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 270-75) (proposed Nov. 20,
1997) ("IT]here is legitimate concern among States and others that election of the [Family
Violence Option] might put States at special risk of incurring financial penalties."); Sarah
Pekkanen, Amendment added to HHS spending bill would protect domestic violence vic-
tims, Gannett News Service, Sept. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8837018 (noting that
states "are hesitating because they fear that without a congressional go-ahead, it might cost
them federal funds"); Vobejda, supra note 62 (assuming waivers for domestic violence fall
under Hardship Exception and noting competing interests).
88 See A Bill To clarify the family violence option under the temporary assistance to
needy families program, S. 671, 105th Cong. (1997).
89 See id. § 1(1) (discussing intent of Congress in passing Personal Responsibility Act);
Skorneck, supra note 84 ("Critics argue that the [Hardship Exception] was meant to in-
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be subject to any numerical limitations in granting such waivers90 and
that the number of family violence waivers granted will not be in-
cluded for the purpose of determining a state's compliance with work
participation rates.91
According to Senator Wellstone,
What we were asking for was simple: a clear statement that states
can and should waive victims of domestic violence from time limita-
tions and work requirements... without being penalized .... This
clarification will ensure that thousands of women and their families
escape violence and leave the welfare rolls in both a timely and per-
manent manner.92
While the Wellstone-Murray bill has received widespread support
on the Senate floor,93 it never has survived conference committee 4
Senator Arlen Specter, however, has promised to work for Senate
hearings,95 and Senator Murray promises to attach the bill "to every
appropriate piece of legislation from now until it is law.
'"96
In November 1997, HHS promulgated a proposed rule 97 that
speaks, in part, to the relationship between the Family Violence Op-
tion and both work participation rates and the twenty percent cap on
Hardship Exceptions. HHS has attempted to balance the Personal
dude domestic violence victims and worry the provision would open up a giant loophole in
the law....").
90 See S. 671 § 2(a) (proposing amendment to Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 602(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997)).
91 See id.
92 U.S. Gov't Press Release, Wellstone-Murray Amendment on Domestic Violence,
Sept. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12102498 (emphasis added). Note that the language
of the Wellstone-Murray amendment does not require states to implement a waiver. How-
ever, Senator Wellstone's comments make it clear that the idea behind the bill is to tell
states they should implement a waiver.
93 When attached to a Labor-HHS appropriations bill in September 1997, the Well-
stone-Murray bill passed by a vote of 98 to 1. See NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Action Alert, Family Violence Option (Oct. 14,1997) [hereinafter NOW LDEF Ac-
tion Alert] (on file with the New York University Law Review). Senator Jesse Helms was
the lone dissenter. See Pekkanen, supra note 87.
94 See NOW LDEF Action Alert, supra note 93 (describing how bill passed in Senate
three times and then was stripped in conference committee). Most recently, the bill lan-
guished and died in a Senate conference committee on October 30, 1997. See NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Family Violence Option Alert, House Republicans Still
Don't Get It! (Nov. 3, 1997) (recounting that some Republican senators would have al-
lowed temporary waiver to be granted only if woman was "bruised and bleeding in front of
a caseworker").
95 See NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 94 (noting that "the issue
is not over").
96 Skorneck, supra note 84.
97 See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed Rule, 62
Fed. Reg. 62,124 (1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 270-75) (proposed Nov. 20,1997).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1998]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Responsibility Act's objective of self-sufficiency98 with the recognition
that time-limited welfare benefits could "make it difficult for individu-
als to escape domestic violence, unfairly penalize victims, or put indi-
viduals at further risk of domestic violence." 99 It therefore has
proposed a rule that would waive a state's penalty 00 for failing to
achieve work participation rates' 0' or exceeding the twenty percent
cap on exceptions'02 when such failure or excess is attributable to the
provision of "good cause domestic violence waivers," defined as waiv-
ers "under the Family Violence Option that [are]: (1) Granted appro-
priately, based on need, as determined by an individualized
assessment; (2) Temporary, for a period not to exceed six months; and
(3) Accompanied by an appropriate services plan designed to provide
safety and lead to work.' 10 3 While this rule is still a proposal1°4 and
the authority of IHS to prescribe these requirements for time limit
98 See id. at 62,128 ("[W]e are reflecting the statutory language and maintaining the
focus on moving families to self-sufficiency.").
99 Id.
100 Unlike the Wellstone-Murray bill, where exceptions for survivors of domestic vio-
lence are not subject to any numerical limitations, see supra notes 90-91 and accompanying
text, HHS reads the current Personal Responsibility Act to require that survivors of do-
mestic violence be included in the pool of welfare recipients used to calculate work partici-
pation rates, see Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 62,128, and that the number of exceptions granted to survivors of
domestic violence be counted toward the 20% limit set forth in the Hardship Exception,
see id.
101 See id. at 62,188 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 271.52) (stating that HHS "will not
impose a penalty... if [a state] demonstrates that failure to meet the work participation
rates is attributable to its provision of good cause domestic violence waivers").
102 See id. at 62,196 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 274.3) (stating that HHS "will not
impose the penalty [for failing to meet the five-year limit] ... if [a state] demonstrates that
it exceeded the 20 percent limitation on exceptions to the time limit because of good cause
waivers provided to victims of domestic violence").
103 Id. at 62,182 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 270.30). This definition still gives each
state broad discretion to determine how to administer such an exception. For a detailed
proposal, see infra Part III.C.
104 While lauded for its recognition of the link between domestic violence and poverty,
see, e.g., NOW LDEF Sample Comment, supra note 80, at 1, the proposed rule also has
been criticized for several reasons. For example, its provision that waivers may not exceed
six months contravenes the language of the Family Violence Option. See id. at 2-3 (criticiz-
ing this aspect of HHS rule and proposing that waivers should not be subject to any time
limits). Compare Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 62,127 (providing six-month waivers), with Personal Responsibility
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that states may grant
waivers "for so long as necessary"). Also, only 21 states (plus the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico) have adopted Family Violence Option provisions that satisfy HHS. See
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Analysis of Family Violence Option Proposed
Federal Regulations: Possible Areas of Comment 1 (1997) [hereinafter NOW LDEF Possi-
ble Areas of Comment]. Exceptions granted under state welfare plans that provide serv-
ices for survivors of domestic violence but do not do so under the heading "Family
Violence Option" will not be recognized by HHS. See id.
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exceptions under the Family Violence Option is unclear,OS the pro-
posed rule highlights the federal government's support for exceptions
to welfare time limits for survivors of domestic violence. Indeed, in
the discussion preceding the proposed rule, HIIS states that the
Clinton administration "is strongly committed to reducing domestic
violence, and [encourages] all States to consider adopting the Family
Violence Option."'
10 6
While the Wellstone-Murray bill and the proposed HHS rule
both provide strong evidence that the federal government believes
that states should provide exceptions to time limits for survivors of
domestic violence, it is, of course, too soon to regard either as a defini-
tive or binding statement that states should do so. Such a policy, how-
ever, also is consistent with the emphasis that current federal law
places on combating domestic violence. This priority is displayed
most prominently in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994107
(VAWA). VAWA criminalizes some activity related to domestic vio-
lence 08 and provides federal funds for a multitude of state programs
to combat violence, including strengthened legal enforcement and ad-
vocacy,10 9 a battered women's hotline,110 and battered women's shel-
ters.1 1' VAWA indicates that Congress believes that survivors of
domestic violence have a compelling claim on federal resources, and
further suggests that Congress wants to encourage states to expend
their resources to aid survivors of domestic violence. 112
105 Compare Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 62,128 (claiming authority to regulate "where Congress has charged
HIIS with enforcing penalties, even if there is no explicit mention of regulation"), with
NOW LDEF Possible Areas of Comment, supra note 104, at 1 ("[l]t is not clear that HHS
has the authority to limit the definition of good cause waivers under the VFamily Violence
Option] in the way that they have."), and NOW LDEF Sample Comment, supra note 80, at
2-5 (arguing that HHS lacks authority to limit Family Violence Option waivers to six
months or to require that states have service plans for survivors of domestic violence).
106 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed Rule, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 62,128.
107 Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VAWA].
108 See 18 U.S.C. §3 2261-2262 (1994) (criminalizing crossing state line with intent either
to injure or intimidate spouse or intimate partner or to violate order of protection); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)-(c) (1994) (declaring right of all people to be free from gender
motivated violence and creating federal civil rights cause of action for victims of such
crimes).
109 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh (1994) (encouraging states to implement pro-arrest poli-
cies, improve tracking of domestic violence cases, strengthen legal advocacy programs, and
educate judges).
110 See id. § 10416 (establishing grant for national domestic violence hotline).
111 See id. §§ 10402(f), 10409 (providing funds for battered women's shelters).
112 It is possible to criticize this reasoning for being underinclusive. Federal law recog-
nizes that citizens have the right to be free not only from gender based violence, but also
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Given this extensive concern with survivors of domestic violence,
it seems unlikely that Congress would provide states with the Hard-
ship Exception and the Family Violence Option and then punish them
for adopting these provisions. Therefore, despite some uncertainty
about the exact contours and availability of a waiver program, the
existence of both the Hardship Exception and the Family Violence
Option in the Personal Responsibility Act, the still-pending
Wellstone-Murray bill, the proposed HHS rule, and the priority evi-
denced in VAWA combine to argue persuasively that states should be
able to waive time limits for survivors of violence without negative
repercussions.
II
DoMESTc VIOLENCE IS A WORTHY BASIS
FOR AN EXCEPTION FROM TIME LIMITS
All of this, however, begs the normative question: Should states
implement an exception targeted at survivors of abuse? Part II of this
Note explores this issue and concludes that states should create a wel-
fare regime that takes special account of survivors of domestic vio-
lence. Part II.A. defines domestic violence and explores what it is
about such violence that gives survivors a superior claim to scarce
state welfare resources. Part II.B. then examines how allowing an ex-
ception for survivors of domestic violence may have deeper ramifica-
tions on our thinking about the values and incentives implicated by
our welfare system. It argues that an exception to welfare time limits
for this group is consistent with the various theories of welfare reform
and welfare dependency that motivated the Personal Responsibility
Act.
A. Domestic Violence Survivors Have Unique Needs that Deserve
Special Treatment
1. Nature of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence has been defined as "a pattern of coercive be-
havior that includes the physical, sexual, economic, emotional, and
from discrimination on racial, religious, and ethnic grounds. Yet, it has never been sug-
gested that these other categories should form the basis for an exception to welfare time
limits, even if an exception so formulated would withstand constitutional challenge. It is
the contention of this Note that gender motivated violence distinguishes itself as a basis for
an exception to welfare time limits, because such violence not only violates the civil rights
of its victims but also severely undermines their ability to enter the job market successfully.
See infra Part II.A.
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psychological abuse of one person by another."113 Widespread public
awareness of domestic violence began just over twenty years ago.
114
The intervening years have seen the growth of psychosocial theories
explaining domestic violence 1 5 and a growing awareness that it is a
113 Karla M. Digirolamo, Myths and Misconceptions About Domestic Violence, 16 Pace
L. Rev. 41, 44 (1995); see also Del Martin, Overview-Scope of the Problem, in U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy 205,219 (1978) (arguing
that husband-wife power relationship is defined more by economics than by psychology or
biology). Many commentators frame the issue of domestic violence in terms of the individ-
ual dynamics of power and control. See, e.g., Digirolamo, supra, at 44 ("The 'goal' of this
abuse is to help one person achieve and maintain power and control over the other.").
However, some commentators see domestic violence as a systemic problem, "rooted pri-
marily in the structure of the social order, rather than the pathological psyches of individ-
ual men." Kathleen J. Ferraro, Cops, Courts, and Woman Battering, in Violence Against
Women: The Bloody Footprints 165, 165 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds.,
1993); see also Martin, supra, at 216 (arguing that institution of marriage socializes women
and men to act in dominant and submissive roles and that "[t]hese roles are incorporated
into the culture by its philosophy, science, social and psychological theory, morality, and
law"). Under this view, criminal justice, with its aim of punishing individual deviants, is
"fundamentally at odds with a structural, gendered analysis of woman battering." Ferraro,
supra, at 165.
114 See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in
Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 Rutgers L
Rev. 1139,1162 (1996) (noting that "as recently as 1974 there were no effective legal reme-
dies and little public acknowledgment that family violence was a serious problem");
Digirolamo, supra note 113, at 43 (noting that "[t]hings have changed in the last seventeen
years"); Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L & Pory 237,
239 (1994) (describing advent of effective movement against domestic violence). For much
of our history, abusing one's wife was an accepted practice and privilege of being a hus-
band. See id. (outlining import of English common law on marital relations into American
law). For example, a husband was permitted to beat his wife as long as he did not use a
switch any thicker than his thumb. See Martin, supra note 113, at 209 (reporting that
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in 1874 that as long as husband inflicted no perma-
nent injury on his wife, "'it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave
the parties to forget and forgive."' (quoting Robert Calvert, Criminal and Civil Liability in
Husband-Wife Assaults, in Violence in the Family 88, 89 (Suzanne K. Steinmetz & Murray
A. Straus eds., 1974))).
115 Dr. Lenore E. Walker's The Battered Woman (1979) was the groundbreaking work
on the dynamics of domestic violence. Dr. Walker argued that a battering relationship
progresses through three cycles: the tension-building phase, the acute battering incident,
and the loving phase. See id. at 55-70. Additionally, she claimed that this process results in
"learned helplessness," where women become passive and cease trying to leave the rela-
tionship. See id. at 42-54.
Walker's work, however, has been criticized as trapping women in victimhood, rob-
bing them of their autonomy, and failing to empower them. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Re-
Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58
Alb. L. Rev. 973,973-76 (1995) (arguing that battered women must be viewed as survivors,
whose fundamental human rights are being violated and who are entitled to justice).
Others have pointed out that not all domestic violence follows a cycle; violence may come
"out of the blue" and the batterer may not be contrite at all. See Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered
Woman Syndrome, 21 Hofstra L Rev. 1191, 1208 (1993) (arguing that battered women
may live in "state of siege").
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serious problem that should not be left to intra-family resolution.
Both the social service and legal worlds have developed services and
protections for battered women.116 However, despite these efforts,
domestic violence remains one of the leading causes of injury to
women in this country.117 It has been estimated that in the United
States between two and four million women are battered each year.
118
2. Domestic Violence Is a Major Impediment to Job-Readiness
While every battering relationship has its own unique dynamics,
observers have been able to identify reactions common among bat-
tered women.1 9 Many experience similar psychological distresses, in-
cluding fear and anxiety, depression, nightmares and flashbacks,
anger, difficulty concentrating, dissociation, and addictive behav-
iors. 20 Many battered women have low self-esteem, feel responsible
for the violence, and fail to see alternatives to staying in a violent rela-
tionship.' 2 ' Furthermore, in battering relationships, which occur in
116 See Bassler, supra note 114, at 1162 (listing legal reforms, including civil protection
orders, arrest and law enforcement, mediation of custody disputes, and civil damages for
family violence). One controversial legal development is the admission of testimony on
the "battered woman syndrome" as an element of self-defense when women are charged
with murdering their partners. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 115, at 1195 (arguing that
battered woman syndrome is currently too narrowly defined); Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140
U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 387-88 (1991) (arguing for uniform application of self-defense doctrine
in trials of battered women for murder).
117 See Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 Clearing-
house Rev. 420,423 (1991); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1501 (1993). Domestic violence leads to more injuries than
those caused by auto accidents, muggings, and rapes combined. See Evan Stark and Anne
Flitcraft, Violence among Intimates: An Epidemiological Review, in Handbook of Family
Violence 293, 301 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988). Although some men also are
victims of abuse, 95% to 98% of victims of spousal abuse are women. See McKenzie,
supra note 4, at 9.
118 See Women and Violence: Hearings on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem
of Violent Crime Against Women Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
117 (1990) (statement of Angela Browne, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Medical
School). Approximately 1350 women are murdered by their partners each year. See FBI,
Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 19 (1994).
119 But see Dutton, supra note 115, at 1225 (arguing that there is no single battered
woman profile because psychological reactions of battered women differ in type and
severity).
120 See id. at 1221-23 (reviewing psychological effects of physical and sexual violence).
Often, but not always, the psychological effects of battering will rise to the level that the
woman will be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. See id. at 1222.
121 See Digirolamo, supra note 113, at 46 (commenting that low self-esteem makes
women vulnerable to, and perhaps also responsible for, violence); Dutton, supra note 115,
at 1218-20 (discussing cognitive reactions to violence and abuse).
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every socioeconomic class, the woman is often financially dependent
on the batterer.122
The dynamics of domestic violence make it extremely difficult for
many currently and previously battered women to join the workforce
successfully. Indeed, domestic violence has been identified as "the
'biggest issue for successful transition into the workplace.'" 1z An
abuser may not allow his partner to work at all out of jealousy that she
would meet another man or fear that she would become emotionally
and financially independent.12 When a battered woman does attempt
to establish herself in a permanent job, her batterer may sabotage her
efforts by increasing violence at home,'2 using tricks to prevent her
from studying or being on time for work,126 or harassing her at
work.127 Furthermore, if an abused woman does enter the workforce,
Im See Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of
Violence, 22 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1141, 1150-51 (1995) (finding that batterers deprive
women of access to cash, checking, and charge accounts and noting that high level of eco-
nomic dependence puts women at risk of serious injury); Digirolamo, supra note 113, at 45
(finding that battered women are "controlled through a sophisticated pattern of economic
abuse").
1B Davis & Kraham, supra note 122, at 1151 (quoting Sue Boyd of Denver Family Op-
portunity Program).
124 See Ruth A. Brandwein, Viewpoint, Cut in Aid Perils Curbing of Abuse, Newsday,
Jan. 8, 1997, at A31 (citing findings of Chicago's Taylor Institute on survivors of abuse).
125 It is common for women to drop out of job training programs or not show up for
work because they have visible bruises, black eyes, or cigarette bums. See Jody Raphael,
Recent Development, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist
Theory of Welfare Dependency, 19 Harv. Women's IU. 201,205-06 (1996) (reporting Tay-
lor Institute findings).
M6 A man may engage in a multitude of "non-violent" tactics to keep a woman from
doing well: he may turn off an alarm clock so that she misses an appointment; he may
quarrel with her all night before an interview or exam so that she cannot perform well; or
he may fail to provide needed and promised child care. See id. (listing common stories
related by abuse survivors to researchers). The story of Bernice Haynes is typical: She was
on welfare and enrolled in a program to become a licensed nurse. Her boyfriend tossed
her textbooks into the garbage. He refused to watch their two children while she was in
class. He would pick fights with her when she tried to study, and fought all weekend with
her before her final exam. She failed her exam and consequently was kicked out of the
program-which she had been attending for a year-just twelve weeks before graduation.
See Gonnerman, supra note 83, at 21 (reporting that Haynes is now case manager at wel-
fare-to-work program).
127 See Joan Zorza, Women Battering- High Costs and the State of the Law, 28
Clearinghouse Rev. 383, 384 (1994) (reporting Oklahoma study that 96% of women who
worked while involved in abusive relationship experienced trouble at work). Abusers also
can harass a woman over the phone. See Davis & Kraham, supra note 122, at 1152 (noting
that over half of women who worked while involved in abusive relationship were harassed
over telephone); Raphael, supra note 125, at 206 (noting some abuse victims' frequent
receipt of harassing phone calls at work). This may be problematic not only because it is
threatening to the woman but also because some jobs forbid personal phone calls. See id.
at 206 (indicating that such calls can sound "death knell" for employment). Abusers also
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her own psychological scars may keep her from success. 128 She may
be too anxious or angry to relate well to co-workers or clients, or she
may not be able to take orders from superiors or follow complex
instructions. 1
29
Women who have escaped violent relationships also are at a dis-
advantage in the job market. At a minimum, they might have to take
time from work to pursue therapy130 or to meet court dates to enforce
orders of protection or custody orders. For some, safe escape requires
that they leave their lives behind completely. Without any possessions
and little money, and without any references from old employers, it is
extremely hard for these women to reestablish themselves and to find
immediate employment.
131
3. Time Limits on Welfare Could Be Particularly Devastating
to Survivors of Violence
Studies indicate that between fifty and eighty percent of women
who receive welfare benefits are past or current victims of physical or
may come directly to a woman's place of work and threaten her or her co-workers. See id.
(noting embarrassing and threatening nature of such encounters).
128 See Brandwein, supra note 124 (stating that post-traumatic stress disorder makes it
impossible for some survivors of domestic violence to interview or go out in public); see
also NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Executive Summary, Report from the
Front Lines: The Impact of Violence on Poor Women 5 (1996) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) ("[A]fter years of being told by their abusers that they are worth-
less and incompetent .... women have difficulty presenting themselves well in interviews
and other employment situations.").
129 See Brandwein, supra note 124.
130 While therapy certainly is an option for some survivors of violence, some commenta-
tors question whether it is an appropriate treatment. See Martin, supra note 113, at 222
(arguing that one-on-one therapy is harmful because it is based on patriarchal structure
and implies that survivors are sick); Gonnerman, supra note 83, at 22 ("['W]ork is often a
stronger therapeutic tool than counseling .... It improves their self-esteem and can make
them feel in control of their lives."' (quoting Lucy Friedman, Executive Director, New
York City's Victim Services)).
131 See Davis & Kraham, supra note 122, at 1153 (commenting that when women go
"underground," fear of revealing new location or informing potential employers of violent
history dissuades women from giving references and thus keeps them from getting new
jobs). It has been estimated that between 50% and 90% of battered women try to escape.
See id. at 1146 (citing Patricia Horn, Beating Back the Revolution, Dollars & Sense, Dec.
1992, at 12, 21). At best, leaving a violent partner may require a woman to move great
distances, find new housing, develop new work skills, seek psychological counseling, and
obtain legal aid. See Sheryl L. Howell, Recent Development, How Will Battered Women
Fare Under the New Welfare Reform?, 12 Berkeley Women's L.J. 140, 145-47 (1997) (dis-
cussing expected negative impact of certain Personal Responsibility Act provisions on do-
mestic violence survivors). At worst, leaving a violent partner can result in injury or death.
See Martin, supra note 113, at 215 (noting that "[s]ome ex-husbands continue to stalk and
hunt down 'their' women for years after a divorce, forcing their victims to move and
change jobs continually").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 73:621
EXCEPTION TO WELFARE TIME LIMITS
sexual abuse.132 The prevalence of domestic violence among poor
women and the detrimental impact of violence on the ability of bat-
tered women to work for a sustained period, taken together, indicate
that any strict time limit on the receipt of welfare benefits could result
in grave harms to a substantial number of women and children. 33 For
some battered women, loss of the last resort of public assistance may
force them "to remain in or return to dangerous or life-threatening
situations."' 34 For others, the work requirements may have the effect
of triggering or exacerbating domestic violence. 3 5 For still others, the
effect might be to enmesh them further in poverty because their abus-
132 See Brandwein, supra note 124 (arguing that new welfare law must take violence
toward women into account); see also Contract with America-Welfare Reform, Part 2:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 104th Cong. 1693-94 (1995) (statement of Taylor Institute) (finding that over half
of women in welfare-to-work programs are or have been abused); Greg Weeks & Carol
Webster, Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Over Half of the Women on Public
Assistance in Washington State Reported Physical or Sexual Abuse as Adults 1 (Oct. 1993)
(on file with the New York University Law Review) (calculating that 60% of women on
public assistance in Washington state had been physically or sexually abused as adults);
Implementation of the Federal Personal Responsibility Act of 1996: Hearing Before the
State Assembly Standing Comm. on Ways and Means, the State Assembly Standing
Comm. on Soc. Servs., the State Assembly Standing Comm. on Children and Families, and
the State Assembly Standing Comm. on Labor, Legis. Sess. 220, at 180 (N.Y. Feb. 7, 1997)
(statement of Sherry Leiwant, Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund)
[hereinafter NOW LDEF Testimony] (on file with the New York University Laiw Review)
(estimating that between 30% and 75% of women who receive public assistance in New
York City are victims of domestic violence); id. at 6 (reporting that between 82% and 92%
of welfare mothers in Massachusetts had experienced severe physical or sexual violence in
their lives). The congressional findings listed in the Personal Responsibility Act include
the recognition that "a majority of [teen] mothers have histories of sexual and physical
abuse," and that "[c]hildren born out-of-wedlock are more likely to experience ... more
child abuse, and neglect." Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 note (isting
legislative history) (West Supp. 1997).
133 Furthermore, the prevalence of domestic violence in this population suggests that the
20% cap on hardship exceptions may be grossly inadequate. The Family Violence Option,
however, seems to offer a more flexible framework. See supra notes 83-91, 97-103 and
accompanying text (discussing Wellstone-Murray bill and proposed HHS rule). At the
same time, the prevalence of domestic violence also indicates that an exception to time
limits accorded on this basis could have significant fiscal consequences for the states-a
factor they surely will take into account in designing their welfare programs. See generally
infra Part uI.C.
-34 Davis & Kraham, supra note 122, at 1144; cf. Melinda Henneberger, Welfare Bashing
Finds Its Mark, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 104-75, pt.1, at 416 (1995) (recounting story of
woman, unable to work because she was nine months pregnant, who was so ashamed of
being on welfare that she returned to home of previously abusive father and stayed until
abuse resumed).
135 See Raphael, supra note 125, at 221 (evaluating potential impact of welfare time
limits).
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ers will forbid them to enter the job market.13 6 Even for those who
have escaped violent relationships, the effect might be to drive them
into poverty because they have lost their safety net, or to force them
to forego the time and services needed to recover from the abuse.
1 37
The Hardship Exception and Family Violence Option of the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act give states an opportunity to mitigate these
potential consequences. States should recognize that an inflexibly en-
forced sixty-month limit may not provide enough time for survivors to
establish independent lives, 138 especially if they received welfare
before leaving their abuser. 139 Further, the availability of such excep-
tions also may help states to understand dependency in women's lives
and to recognize that the availability of employment is only one of a
number of factors that will influence women's decisions to enter the
job market. The pervasive presence and crippling influence of domes-
tic violence in the lives of America's poorest families and the potential
positive policy implications of giving them additional time on welfare
thus offer compelling reasons for states to provide exceptions to the
time limits for families struggling with domestic violence.
1 40
136 [W]elfare reform policies intended to push girls and women into the labor mar-
ket after a short period of time will have an unintended effect: welfare depen-
dency will be eliminated, but their partners may not allow these girls and
women to work, making them more economically dependent upon their abus-
ers and more enmeshed in poverty than before.
Id. at 203 (citing anecdotal evidence suggesting that some men would be threatened by
their partner receiving education and training and therefore would prevent their partner
from working despite the loss of benefits).
137 See Brandwein, supra note 124 (commenting that if battered women fail to comply
with work requirements and time limits, they will lose Medicaid coverage and, therefore,
access to necessary medical and mental health care); Raphael, supra note 125, at 221 (not-
ing that abuse victims may "need more time and specialized services than will be available
under time-limited programs").
138 See NOW LDEF Testimony, supra note 132, at 8 (advocating state adoption of Fam-
ily Violence Option for aid extensions).
139 See id. at 8 (noting difficulty for abuse victims to establish independent life within
time limits); Davis & Kraham, supra note 122, at 1157 (noting that "[w]omen may experi-
ence violence throughout their lifetimes and, depending upon the individual circumstances,
may need to rely on [welfare] longer than any arbitrary time limit").
140 "'The rigidity of time limits .. is not going to be workable' . ... [It] 'is likely to result
in human tragedy if women are stalked in the workplace but feel they can't change jobs or
stop going to work.., because they'll lose their benefits-or if women in abusive relation-
ships feel they can't leave because there is no safety net for them any longer."'
Gonnerman, supra note 83, at 21 (quoting Martha Davis, Legal Director, NOW Legal De-
fense and Education Fund).
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B. Exempting Survivors from Time Limits Is Consistent
with the Theories of the Personal Responsibility Act
and Welfare Reform in General
While providing assistance to survivors of domestic violence gen-
erally receives wide support, providing cash benefits to welfare
mothers for unregulated periods of time has been condemned
roundly.141 Indeed, the Personal Responsibility Act was designed to
push recipients from their perceived life of dependence into one char-
acterized by self-sufficiency. 142 As Part I.A. made clear, however, the
categories of "welfare recipients" and "abused women" are not mutu-
ally exclusive and, indeed, overlap significantly.' 43 It is possible, then,
that there exists a latent tension between what on its face is likely to
be an unobjectionable and popular recognition of a state's humanita-
rian duty to aid citizens who are impeded by violence and the eco-
nomic perspective that forms the basis for current welfare reform
theory. Thus, it is important to examine the landscape of theories of
welfare dependency and reform to see how an exemption for survivors
of family violence can be integrated.
1. An Exception for Battered Women Is Consistent with the Moral
and Economic Vision of the Personal Responsibility Act
The impetus for the Personal Responsibility Act was the percep-
tion that the AFDC program actually undermined personal responsi-
bility and initiative.144 This conclusion was based in large part on
generalizations about welfare recipients. Specifically, mainstream
America found fault with "typical" welfare mothers-single, young,
promiscuous, uneducated African American women who assumed
141 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (outlining political support for over-
haul of welfare system).
142 See supra text accompanying note 50 (listing goals of Personal Responsibility Act);
see also Henneberger, supra note 134, at 417 (quoting Rep. E. Clay Shave, Jr.: "'It's going
to be scary for them-no question about it-to come over from a life of receiving a check
for doing nothing' .... 'That's why people have to be pushed oft But in the long run
they'll be much better off and their self-esteem will be raised considerably.'").
143 In the words of one commentator, "Domestic violence victims receive our sympathy
and support. Mothers on welfare receive our disapproval and disdain. How ironic that
these are often the same people ...." Brandwein, supra note 124.
144 See Mary Bryna Sanger, Welfare Reform Within a Changing Context: Redefining
the Terms of the Debate, 23 Fordham Urb. Li. 273, 275 (1996) (noting that for many
Americans, welfare became symbol of what was wrong with America); Williams, supra
note 44, at 725 (recounting thesis that availability of public assistance "creates immorality
and dependence, undermines values, and increases poverty"). But see Sanger, supra, at
275 (iterating alternative view of welfare as "social tool to cushion the economic shocks of
unpredictable and adverse personal events and labor market fluctuations").
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that AFDC benefits would always be available to sustain them and
who had numerous children to increase the amount of benefits.
45
The Personal Responsibility Act was passed to modify the behav-
ior of these welfare recipients so as to reflect the values of "main-
stream" society.146 The Act's clearly stated goal is to create a culture
in which families headed by married, educated, working parents are
the norm, and where the primary values are individual responsibility,
self-reliance, and hard work.147 These goals are based on the long-
standing premise that work fosters dignity148 and that the traditional
family unit is the proper place to impart a pro-work, pro-family ethic
to children.'
49
Having identified its desired ends, the Personal Responsibility
Act creates a seemingly simple set of economic incentives to shape the
145 See Handler, supra note 26, at 865 (describing stereotypical welfare recipients);
Williams, supra note 44, at 743-44 (same). However, AFDC demographics demonstrated
that in reality, recipients of AFDC did not match the stereotypes. See supra notes 29-37
and accompanying text. Some commentators therefore have characterized the welfare re-
form debate as racist and sexist because it feeds on a "deeply embedded stereotype of the
Black single mother-and the slurs of matriarchy, dependency, and promiscuity from
which it springs." Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 Conn.
L. Rev. 879, 881 (1994).
146 In a speech endorsing the Family Support Act of 1988, which created the JOBS pro-
gram and required welfare recipients to make attempts at self-sufficiency, Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan stated, "[T]he problems of children in the United States are overwhelm-
ingly associated with the strength and stability of their families. Our problems do not re-
side in nature, nor yet are they fundamentally economic. Our problems derive from
behavior." 136 Cong. Rec. S14,416-17 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
147 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (listing
as one of primary goals: "promoting job preparation, work, and marriage"); Sanger, supra
note 144, at 291 (finding need to return to traditional American values at heart of welfare
reform proposals).
148 See Williams, supra note 44, at 722 (discussing federal legislators' historical belief
that work fosters dignity).
149 Critics charge that welfare reform is a race and gender biased attempt to impose a
middle class value system on all Americans at the expense of the welfare of poor women
and children. See Raphael, supra note 125, at 213 (describing AFDC as support for
women rejecting traditional marital roles). A feminist critique of welfare reform empha-
sizes that it perpetuates gender bias by encouraging mothers to seek economic security
through men and marriage, see Mink, supra note 145, at 882 (calling reform "a 'shape up in
the home or ship out to work' principle"), and by reinforcing a patriarchal family structure
that undervalues the capacity of women to raise children alone, see Nancy E. Dowd, Stig-
matizing Single Parents, 18 Harv. Women's L.J. 19, 73-74 (1995) (arguing that failure to
raise benefits is based on presumed superiority of nuclear family); cf. Raphael, supra note
125, at 214 (noting tension between wanting to avoid endorsing single, teenage mother-
hood and wanting to criticize traditional family values). One critic has charged that by
characterizing welfare recipients as deviant people with bad values, political leaders have
been able to divert attention from the failure of supply-side economics and political pro-
grams that redistributed money to the rich and increased poverty rates. See Williams,
supra note 44, at 741-42 (exploring origin of placement of blame on welfare recipients).
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behavior of benefits recipients. 150 The Act makes it clear that no per-
son has an entitlement to any benefits.151 Instead, to receive benefits,
individuals must make strides to conform to the Act's pro-work, pro-
family vision. For example, adult recipients must work within twenty-
four months of first receiving benefits.15 2 Finally, and most controver-
sially, the Act seeks to force welfare recipients into sustained employ-
ment by imposing a sixty-month lifetime limit on the receipt of
benefits. 153
Granting time limit exceptions for survivors of abuse might seem
inconsistent with the Personal Responsibility Act's emphasis on work
and independence, since continued benefits would allow battered
women to remain out of the workforce longer than other welfare re-
cipients.154  However, the alternative-cutting battered women off
from benefits-would not provide an incentive to work in many cases,
150 The Act also creates economic incentives to shape state behavior. For example,
states' block grants will be reduced or eliminated if they do not meet certain quotas. See
Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 609(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for
grant reductions of 5% to 21% for failure to meet work participation rates). The Act also
provides positive incentives by creating certain bonus payments. See id. § 603(a)(2) (pro-
viding bonuses for states that reduce out-of-wedlock births); id. § 603(a)(4) (giving bonuses
to states that have high percentage of recipients engaged in work). It is becoming increas-
ingly clear that states have no economic incentives not to provide exceptions for survivors
of domestic violence. For example, under the Wellstone-Murray bill and the proposed
HHlS rule, giving exemptions under the Family Violence Option will not impact a state's
block grant. See supra notes 88-91, 97-103 and accompanying text. Thus, fear of losing
block grant funds should not influence a state's decision regarding whether to grant such
an exception and how many to grant.
151 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Critics estimate that by 2001, the Personal
Responsibility Act will bar 3.5 million poor children from any federal cash assistance. See
Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 32 (citing Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the
Issues 36 (Isabel V. Sawhill ed., 1996)). By 2005, that number will reach 4.86 million poor
children. See id.
152 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
153 See id. § 608(a)(7)(A).
154 One other potential objection to giving exceptions to survivors of domestic violence
might be that doing so would undermine the Personal Responsibility Acts vision of two-
parent families, since providing continued benefits would give women resources with which
to leave their abusers, thus resulting in one-parent homes. However, even its most ardent
supporters likely would agree that this objection takes the Act's pro-family vision to an
unwarranted extreme. The Act favors two-parent families because it indicates that they
are generally the best environment in which to raise children. See id. § 601 note (listing
legislative findings) ("Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which pro-
motes the interests of children."). However, a violent home is far from a desirable envi-
ronment for children. Rates of child abuse in homes where there is spousal violence are
much higher than average, see Panel on Research on Violence Against Women, National
Research Council, Understanding Violence Against Women 84-85 (Nancy A. Crowell &
Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996), and male children raised in such homes frequently grow up to
be abusers themselves, see id. at 62 (stating that one-third of children who have been
abused or witnessed abuse become violent adults). If a goal of the Personal Responsibility
Act is to encourage stable homes for children, then an exception from time limits that
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but an incentive to remain mired in a violent relationship. 155 Given
the reality of the impact of domestic violence on work prepared-
ness,156 allowing continued benefits would not undermine the goals of
the Personal Responsibility Act, but would promote independence in
an important sense by providing battered women with the time and
resources they need to heal.
157
Furthermore, the premise that work gives dignity historically un-
derlies this nation's welfare legislation.158 Requiring abused women
to choose between working in order to continue to receive benefits
and returning to abusive relationships forces them to make choices
that may undermine both their dignity and safety. Returning to work
may open these women to continued physical and mental abuse by
their batterers. 159 Forcing battered women to give up their benefits
and perhaps return to their batterers obviously undermines their dig-
nity and autonomy. An exception to time limits for survivors of vio-
lence, therefore, actually would further the goals of dignity and
independence that underlie the Personal Responsibility Act.
2. An Exception for Battered Women Does Not Necessarily
Endorse Categorical Thought About Welfare Recipients
One enduring criticism of social assistance programs in this coun-
try is that they reinforce a categorical and hierarchical distinction be-
tween "deserving" and "undeserving" poor.160 The "deserving"
poor-those with legitimate, socially acceptable reasons to stay out of
the labor force-are "entitled" to public assistance, while the "unde-
serving" poor-those who are absent unjustifiably from the
would support battered women in removing their children and themselves from an unsta-
ble, violent atmosphere is entirely appropriate.
155 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
157 This is especially true in light of the fact that the Personal Responsibility Act's Fam-
ily Violence Option advises states which adopt it to couple continued benefits with coun-
seling and other services that empower women to leave abusive relationships and establish
independence. See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A) (West Supp.
1997).
158 See Williams, supra note 44, at 722.
159 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 361, 366, 372-74 (1996) (discussing categorical,
hierarchical approach to public assistance programs); Williams, supra note 44, at 725 (dis-
cussing exclusion of "undeserving" poor women from AFDC rolls). For a general discus-
sion of how the poor have been "labeled," see Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor:
The Underclass and Antipoverty Policy 14-18 (1995) (discussing various labels for poor and
origins of such labels).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[V/ol. 73:621
EXCEPTION TO WELFARE TIME LIMITS
workforce-receive government "handouts." 161 This distinction is
problematic because it allows policymakers to levy moral judgments
upon individuals regarding what constitute socially acceptable reasons
for staying out of the labor market.162 The Personal Responsibility
Act has been charged with revitalizing and reinforcing this distinction,
labeling single minority mothers who do not work as "other" and
"immoral."163
Therefore, one possible concern implicated by allowing an excep-
tion to time limits for battered women is that doing so could perpetu-
ate this hierarchical and categorical evaluation of those in our society
who need public assistance: Such an exception could be seen as a cat-
egorical statement that poor battered women are among the "deserv-
ing poor" because their condition is a "disability"-akin to being
blind, for example-which justifies their absence from the workplace
and entitles them to continued public assistance. Understood in this
way, such an exception would be problematic because it could dis-
empower survivors of abuse and send the message that theirs is a
"condition" that makes them chronically unemployable. Further-
161 See Diler, supra note 160, at 366, 372 (discussing views of social welfare as social
insurance and public assistance). The clearest members of the category of "deserving
poor" are the elderly and disabled people who receive benefits under programs such as the
Supplemental Security Income program. See id. at 362, 384-85 (discussing disability
category).
162 For example, the creation in 1935 of the Aid to Dependent Children program indi-
cated that single motherhood and the concomitant need to care for one's children was a
justifiable reason for not entering the workplace, and thus that single mothers could
number among the "deserving poor." See Handier, supra note 26, at 858 (summarizing
perspectives on "undeserving poor" and "deserving poor"). Most states, however, manipu-
lated their Aid to Dependents programs to provide benefits only to white widows and to
deny benefits to single mothers who were divorced, deserted, never married, or members
of racial minorities. See id. at 859. The latter category of women remained regarded as
"undeserving" and "morally suspect." See id. Paradoxically, such mothers were forced to
work outside of the home and then condemned for doing so because it violated the social
code of the time and "evidenced" immorality, intemperance, and vice. See id.
While the AFDC program implemented benefits for unwed, minority mothers, it im-
posed work requirements upon them. See id. at 859. This not only indicated that they still
were regarded as "undeserving poor," but also shifted the emphasized vice to that of not
working. See id. at 859. This categorical condemnation has been heightened under the
Personal Responsibility AcM
163 See, e.g., id. at 858 (describing how early Twentieth Century reformers argued that
only single mothers who were "otherwise fit and proper" according to dominant values
deserved aid); Mink, supra note 145, at 883 ("Today's proposed work requirements, time
limits, and marriage incentives reproduce the welfare stigma. Such requirements differen-
tiate 'them' from 'us,' the 'deviant' from the 'responsible,' and thereby reinforce social
discipline through the work ethic and patriarchal family life."); Williams, supra note 44, at
721-25 (charting notion of undeserving poor and finding that current welfare policy identi-
fies as undeserving those who do not adhere to middle class values). The Personal Respon-
sibility Act thus sends the message that women who are unmarried and unable to find
work-and their children-no longer deserve financial support.
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more, it would place, in a sense, a moral and societal stamp of ap-
proval on women who are "victims."
An exception to time limits for survivors of violence, however,
does not need to be viewed as a categorical statement implicating
value judgments. Instead, it can be seen as a way to reconcile a strong
pro-work policy with the need, in a market economy, to have a pool of
workers who are skilled and job-ready.164 An exception for survivors
of violence, which would give them the time and resources they need
to enter the workforce successfully, is a justifiable and realistic way to
create such a pool. 65
3. An Exception for Battered Women Embodies Essential Dialogue
About the Causes of Welfare Dependency
Different aspects of the Personal Responsibility Act reflect differ-
ent theories regarding poverty and welfare dependency. For example,
rational choice theory is the background paradigm for provisions such
as the sixty-month limitation on welfare benefits.' 66 Proponents of ra-
tional choice theory claim that welfare mothers are rational actors
who purposefully choose to stay on welfare because pursuing the al-
ternative of low wage, low benefit employment will place them in a
worse financial position.167 Charles Murray, a leading rational choice
theorist, has advocated for the elimination of welfare benefits entirely,
164 Whether the economy can generate a sufficient number of well-paying, low-skill jobs
to employ former welfare recipients is a debated topic. Compare Hershkoff & Loffredo,
supra note 11, at 46 (stating that "numerous studies make clear that there are not nearly
enough jobs to supply employment for all the families that will lose public assistance be-
cause of the new law's time limits" and citing studies by David T. Ellwood, Christopher
Jencks & Katherine Edin, Gordon Lafer, and Katherine Newman & Chauncey Lennon),
with Murray, supra note 31, at 291-92 ("[P]eople who follow the data on this issue rarely
say that the real reason we have people on welfare is that there are not enough jobs.").
165 There are, of course, issues other than domestic violence that can render people
chronically unemployable. See Jason DeParle, Newest Challenge for Welfare: Helping the
Hard-Core Jobless, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1997, at Al (noting that "barriers to employ-
ment" include drug addiction and mental illness in addition to family violence). While
such populations also seem to be deserving recipients of benefits extensions, they are not
specifically targeted in the Personal Responsibility Act as battered women are (although
the phenomena of substance abuse and domestic violence often overlap). The goal of this
Note is not to imply that drug addicts or the mentally ill are morally blameworthy and
undeserving of public support, but instead, recognizing the pernicious impact of domestic
violence on the lives of the poor, to suggest ways in which the current framework of the
Personal Responsibility Act can be implemented effectively.
166 See Raphael, supra note 125, at 210-12 (summarizing rational choice theory).
167 See id. at 210 (discussing how rational choice theorists rejected "culture of poverty"
theory). The credibility of this theory has been questioned, however, because so many
recipients cycle on and off welfare, indicating that many recipients do feel the desire to
leave welfare. See id. at 211-12 (summarizing critique of social scientists David Ellwood
and Mary Jo Bane); see also infra note 173 (discussing attitudes of welfare recipients to-
wards work).
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reasoning that the existence of a safety net softens the otherwise harsh
social and economic pressures that would counsel women against be-
coming single mothers and staying out of the workforce. 16s While the
Personal Responsibility Act does not accept Murray's proposal that
welfare should be eliminated entirely, the time limits provision surely
reflects the idea that unlimited availability of a safety net skews the
incentives of the poor.
Other features of the Personal Responsibility Act, however, can
be understood as giving operational force to both the rational choice
idea and the culture of poverty theory, the other principal theory of
welfare dependency.16 9 The culture of poverty theory postulates that
people are poor not because they choose to be, but because they feel
isolated and alienated from mainstream society and lack opportuni-
ties.170 This culture of poverty perpetuates itself from generation to
generation because poor children are raised to be passive and hope-
less171-"'not psychologically geared to take full advantage of... in-
creased opportunities.""' 17 Proponents of the culture of poverty
model emphasize that only major structural changes to the econ-
omy-for example, restoring the industrial base of cities, creating jobs
in the inner city, dispersing concentrations of poverty, and generating
jobs that provide sufficient income to workers-can result in sustained
employment for the underclass. 173
168 See Murray, supra note 31, at 294-95 (arguing for elimination of welfare system). In
Murray's view, private charity would be available to provide services to those who still do
not enter the workforce. See Raphael, supra note 125, at 211 (discussing Murray's "behav-
ioral development theory").
169 See Raphael, supra note 125, at 208-15 (summarizing theories and noting existence
of third theory-feminist anti-patriarchy theory-that welfare provides important safety
net so that women do not have to depend on men).
170 See id. at 208-09 (tracing evolution of culture of poverty theory). The underclass has
been described as "'more and more hopelessly set apart from the nation at large... not
shar[ing] in its life, its ambitions and its achievements."' Gans, supra note 160, at 28 (quot-
ing original definition of "under-class" from Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence 10
(1963)). This definition evolved into one in which race and gender were interwoven. See
id. at 28-31 (describing evolution of "underclass" to describe primarily black, female-
headed families). But see id. at 24-26 (arguing that term "underclass" has replaced "cul-
ture of poverty" and that "culture of poverty" has become pejorative label).
171 See Raphael, supra note 125, at 208-09 (discussing tenets of "culture of poverty"
theory). Note, however, that rational choice theorists have criticized this view as stigma-
tizing the poor as deviant. See id. at 210 (noting rational choice theorists' objection to
culture of poverty theory).
172 Gans, supra note 160, at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Oscar Lewis, The Cul-
ture of Poverty, in On Understanding Poverty 188 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 196S)).
173 See Raphael, supra note 125, at 208-10. Indeed, some surveys of welfare recipients
provide support for this idea. In such surveys, most recipients have indicated that they
want to work and believe that it is fair to require them to do so. See Sanger, supra note
144, at 313. They say that the true hurdles to sustained employment include lack of child-
care, lack of education and training programs, and fear that low-paying jobs may not pro-
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The provisions allowing states to create an exception to time lim-
its for battered women can be interpreted as consonant with both the-
ories of welfare dependency. Considering the difficulty for survivors
of domestic violence in entering the workforce quickly and success-
fully, the absence of a time limit exception could force a woman to
choose between returning to an abusive relationship, on one hand,
and a complete lack of income and homelessness, on the other.174
Neither choice is "rational" when considered against the pro-family,
pro-work tenets of the Personal Responsibility Act.175 An exception
to time limits would allow a survivor of domestic violence the more
rational choice of extricating herself and her children from violence
and eventually returning to work. However, it is also possible to view
exceptions as reflecting the understanding that remaining in pro-
longed poverty is not a "rational response" at all, but a complex reac-
tion to social and economic factors by those mired in a culture of
poverty.
Therefore, no matter what the controlling theory, an exception to
time limits for survivors of abuse is an essential component of the cur-
rent welfare scheme because it recognizes that some portion of the
poor population-for whatever reason-will not be able to achieve
independence within five years of receiving benefits. Furthermore,
because such an exception can be framed and justified under either
theory, it can serve as a vehicle for an important dialogue about the
causes of poverty and welfare dependency.
In sum, the Hardship Exception and the Family Violence Option
are means by which states can exempt battered women from the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act's sixty-month time limit. States not only can
provide such exceptions, they should. Exceptions are a necessary co-
rollary to the work incentives of the Personal Responsibility Act and
the realities of a market economy. Exceptions also recognize the spe-
cial struggle of poor abused women and their need for more time to
settle their lives, and thus should be a central component of a state's
welfare regime as the debate over how to break the cycle of welfare
dependency continues. Therefore, with the view that states can and
should implement an exception to welfare time limits for survivors of
abuse, the next question is how they should do so.
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174 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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WHAT PROCEDURES SHOULD STATES IMPLEMENT
TO ExEMr SURVIVORS OF DomESTic VioLENcE
FROM Tamm LIr,=lS?
Thus far, states have been quite responsive in drafting the Hard-
ship Exception and/or Family Violence Option provisions into their
welfare legislation. Twenty-seven states have adopted the Family Vio-
lence Option in their welfare plans1 76 and seventeen others have in-
cluded some provision to benefit survivors of domestic violence.
177
Six states have not included any domestic violence provisions in their
welfare plans,178 although two of those states have legislation pending
that would adopt the Family Violence Option.
179
Adopting a provision that establishes the availability of an excep-
tion to time limits for survivors of domestic violence, however, is not
the end of the story. States also must develop procedures to govern
the application and decisionmaking processes for their time limit ex-
ceptions.180 The ways in which states shape their standards regarding
what constitutes a meritorious application will determine whether
their exceptions are real guarantees of extra time for survivors of vio-
176 See NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summary of state activity regarding
Family Violence provisions in their state welfare plans (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter NOW
LDEF Family Violence Summary] (on file with the New York University Law Review)
(listing as "[s]tates that have adopted or enable the Family Violence Option provisions in
their welfare plans": Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). Guam and Puerto Rico
also have adopted the Family Violence Provision. See id. However, only 21 states have
adopted Family Violence Option to the degree required by proposed HHS rule. See NOW
LDEF Possible Areas of Comment, supra note 104.
177 See NOW LDEF Family Violence Summary, supra note 176 (listing as "[s]tates
which have not adopted the Family Violence Option provisions, but have some domestic
violence language or provisions in their welfare plans": Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin). The District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands also have incorporated some sort of domestic violence language in
their legislation. See id. Idaho and Oregon's provisions are almost identical to the Rmily
Violence Option. See id. n5.
178 See id. (listing Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Vermont).
179 See id. n.6 (listing Michigan and Vermont).
180 Compare, e.g., An Act Concerning Welfare Reform and the Expenditures of the
Department of Social Services, No. 97-2, §§ 2-3, 1997 Conn. Acts 1645, 1650-1652 (Spec.
Sess.) (allowing extensions of benefits where domestic violence is of sufficient magnitude
to render applicant unemployable and providing that evidence of domestic violence may
include, but is not limited to, police records, documentation from social service, legal, or
medical professionals, and sworn statement of individuals--including benefits recipient-
with knowledge of circumstances of domestic violence), with Mont. Code Ann. § 534-212
(1997) (providing for exemption but failing to set forth procedures for implementation).
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lence or merely theoretical abstractions. Therefore, this section out-
lines a procedural scheme that states can use as they implement their
exceptions.
A. General Desirable Characteristics of a System
to Implement Exceptions
Having discerned that each state can and should provide excep-
tions to time limits for survivors of domestic violence, each state now
must design procedures that both offer easy access to families strug-
gling with violence and adequately protect the state's interest in ad-ministering scarce resources properly. Before exploring in a more
detailed manner the legal and procedural mechanisms available to
states, it is appropriate to evaluate in general terms how the system
should be structured to effect the interests of both the applicants and
the states.
In general, those who apply and qualify for an exception will be
poor, unemployed, and relatively uneducated women faced with the
imminent loss of income. All will have young children needing their
attention, and many will have long histories of abuse. Few will have
the assistance of counsel or even social service workers in preparing
the application. 181 Some may not be fluent in English. Accessibility
and simplicity, therefore, must be hallmarks of the application process
for an exception for survivors of domestic violence. The application
process should be informal, uncomplicated, and expedited.182 Be-
cause many survivors of violence have had limited interactions with
181 Survivors of domestic violence often do not have the means to obtain representation.
For example, petitioners for orders of protection, often survivors of domestic violence,
frequently appear pro se. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement:
Another Pirouette, 6 Hastings Women's L.J. 339, 350 n.38 (1995) (citing statistics that in
three different jurisdictions, 80%, 80.03%, and 65.8% of petitioners for orders of protec-
tion appeared pro se).
182 Applicants also have a due process interest in having fair and objective procedures.
While Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), held that AFDC recipients were entitled to a
full and fair hearing before the government reduced their benefits, see id. at 267-68, the
applicability of Goldberg in the Personal Responsibility Act regime is unclear because wel-
fare is no longer viewed as an entitlement, see Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 53-
54. The Personal Responsibility Act implicitly recognizes, however, that states must
continue to conform to due process in its requirement that states provide "an explanation
of how the State will provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely affected
to be heard in a State administrative or appeal process." Personal Responsibility Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1997). Because the Act does not impose any spe-
cific requirements on states and therefore leaves the exact scope of due process rights in
this area unsettled, see Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 54 (calling on states to
guarantee adequate notice and hearing rights and on courts to hold such rights constitu-
tionally mandated), they are not the focus of the regime proposed in this Note, see infra
Part III.C.4. (recommending limited review of adverse decisions).
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social service agencies, police, or courts,183 it is in their interest to
have an application procedure that honors evidence of abuse from
sources other than "official" ones.
Because states have limited resources to allocate for administra-
tion of their programs,184 they will need to create easily administrable
systems, characterized by time- and personnel-efficient procedures.
An application process in which applicants present their petitions and
supporting evidence in the form of affidavits and documents is prefer-
able, so that time-consuming personal appearances are kept to a mini-
mum. States likely will want to set time limits to govern the period in
which a petitioner must file a complete application and in which the
agency must make its decision. They will want to set evidentiary hur-
dles low enough so that decisionmakers have discretion to award ex-
ceptions when they believe that evidence of domestic violence is truly
compelling, and yet high enough to deter fraudulent claims. 185
Because states have had to create and implement an entire re-
gime of welfare and work-preparation programs in a very short period
of time,1 6s it is in their best interest to draw from experience in creat-
ing a system to administer an exception to welfare time limits. For
example, to the greatest extent possible, states will want to use per-
sonnel previously trained in evaluating claims of violence. They also
should look to procedures already developed in other areas of the law
in which state officials evaluate allegations of domestic violence. The
following section outlines two such procedures.
B. Two Models of Administration
1. The Good Cause Exception to the AFDC Paternity Cooperation
Requirement
A procedure that states can look to for guidance is one that was
developed under AFDC to administer the good cause exception to
paternity cooperation requirements. 187 Under AFDC, mothers were
183 See, e.g., Ferraro, supra note 113, at 172 (finding that abusers intimidate and manipu-
late women to drop charges).
184 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 604(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (limiting
to 15% portion of block grant that may be allocated for administrative purposes).
185 For a discussion of the actual likelihood of fraudulent claims, see infra notes 236-37
and accompanying text.
186 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 note (West Supp. 1997) (setting
transition date at later of either July 1,1997 or six months after submission of state plan to
Secretary of Health and Human Services).
187 While the Personal Responsibility Act rejected AFDC as a flawed and failed system,
see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text, and encouraged states to experiment with
new ideas and programs, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, for states to discard
every aspect of the AFDC regime would be indiscriminate and inefficient. While states
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required to establish the paternity of their children so that child sup-
port payments could be levied from the father. Good cause for non-
compliance existed when a petitioner's cooperation in establishing
paternity was reasonably anticipated to result in physical or emotional
harm to the child or to the child's parent or caretaker relative. 188
When a mother did not comply with cooperation requirements, the
agency would advise her in writing of her duties, the penalties for non-
cooperation, and the availability of the good cause exception. 189 If
she then claimed to be eligible for the exception, she was not required
to appear in person at the agency, but had twenty days to provide
corroborative evidence of her claim to the agency. 190 The agency, at
the request of the petitioner, would assist her in obtaining such evi-
dence,191 but ultimately, the petitioner had the burden of proof.192
should not overlook the system's shortcomings, they also should not refuse to recognize its
merits.
Federal regulations implementing AFDC's good cause exception are a valuable re-
source because they provide states with an example of a detailed procedural system that
received and evaluated allegations of domestic violence. Further, the general structure of
AFDC paternity cooperation requirements parallels the time limit system Congress estab-
lished under the Personal Responsibility Act, involving overarching state discretion, cer-
tain federal requirements, and a good cause exception to an otherwise strict rule. See 42
U.S.C. § 654(3)-(4) (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 654
(West Supp. 1997) (giving substantial power to states to develop and administer plans for
establishing paternity); id. § 602(a)(26)(B), amended by Personal Responsibility Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 602 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring states to terminate benefits of any parent who
refused to cooperate in establishing paternity and/or securing child support payments and
allowing noncompliant parents to retain benefits upon showing of good cause).
188 See 45 C.F.R. § 232.42(a)(1) (1996) (requiring anticipated harm to be so severe as to
reduce caretaker's capacity to care for child adequately). The purpose of the exception
was to protect the best interests of the child involved. See id. § 232.42(a) (defining good
cause circumstances as those under which cooperation would be against child's best
interests).
189 See id. § 232.40(b) (requiring notice to applicant). The regulations require that a
copy of the notice be delivered to the parent by hand and that the parent sign another copy
to verify its receipt. See id. § 232.40(b)(1)(ii)-(iii).
190 See id. § 232.43(b) (setting time limitations for production of evidence with reason-
able extensions in extraordinary cases). In practice, the good cause exception was rarely
invoked. Less than one percent of AFDC recipients applied for it. See Raphael, supra
note 125, at 222 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 33,211 (1995)). Of those who did apply, just over 64%
had their applications granted. See Lisa Kelly, If Anybody Asks You Who I Am: An
Outsider's Story of the Duty to Establish Paternity, 3 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 247, 248 n.2
(1995) (citing Office of Child Support Enforcement, Sixteenth Annual Report to Congress
108 (1991)). Observers attribute the dearth of applications to several factors, including
insufficient publicity about the existence of the exception, see id., and fear that claims and
information about intra-family violence would not be kept confidential, see Raphael, supra
note 125, at 222.
191 See 45 C.F.R. § 232.40(b)(2)(ii)(B) ("[U]pon request, the State or local agency will
provide reasonable assistance in obtaining the corroborative evidence .... ."). The peti-
tioner received this information in writing from the agency. See id. § 232.40(b)(1)(ii).
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Acceptable corroborative evidence was defined broadly.193 If the pe-
titioner made a claim of anticipated physical harm but lacked any cor-
roborative evidence, she could still prevail. However, in such a
situation, the agency not only had to be satisfied that her claim was
credible, but also had to contact the putative father to verify her
claims.194 To avoid this notice to the abuser, the petitioner had to
withdraw her claim. 195
The agency would render its final decision within forty-five days
of the initial claim.196 If the petitioner's application was granted, su-
pervisory personnel within the agency automatically would review the
decision, with the discretion to accept or reject the outcome. 97 If the
petitioner's application was denied initially or by supervisors, she had
no right of appeal.198
192 See id. § 232.43(a) (stating that if agency found that corroborative evidence "actually
verifie[d]" claim, petitioner would be excused from cooperation requirement). In practice,
it seems that state agencies adhered to stringent evidentiary standards and largely were
unwilling to grant uncorroborated claims. For example, one Minnesota court held that a
mother/applicant who had been raped by her child's father but did not report the rape to
the police for fear of further harm to herself and her child did not qualify for the good
cause exception because she lacked corroborative evidence. See Waller v. Carlton County
Human Servs. Dep't, No. C6-89-1116, 1989 WL 145393 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1989).
193 Acceptable corroborative evidence included.
(3) Court, medical, criminal, child protective services, social services, psycho-
logical, or law enforcement records which indicate that the putative father...
might inflict physical or emotional harm on the child or caretaker relative;
(4) Medical records which indicate emotional health history and present emo-
tional health status .. or, written statements from a mental health profes-
sional indicating a diagnosis or prognosis... ;
(6) Sworn statements from individuals other than the applicant or recipient
with knowledge of the circumstances which provide the basis for the good-
cause claim.
45 C.F.R. § 232.43(c)(3)-(4), (6).
194 See id. § 232.43(f)(1), (h)(1) (requiring agency to investigate and defining investiga-
tion as contacting putative father). This rule in effect removed the possibility of prevailing
on a credible but uncorroborated claim. Many abused women would rather have with-
drawn their claims and lost their benefits than risked being located again by their abusers.
By contacting a father to corroborate an application, the state imperiled, rather than insu-
lated, an abused mother or child.
195 See id. § 232.43(h)(2)(ii).
196 See id. § 232.41(c) (requiring decision within 45 days unless additional time is needed
to gather corroborative evidence).
197 See id. § 232.43(f)(3) ("A determination that good cause exists will be reviewed and
approved or disapproved by supervisory personnel ....").
198 See id. § 232.41(d) (stating that if agency determines good cause does not exist, ap-
plicant may cooperate or face sanctions).
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2. Self-Petitioning Procedures for Battered Immigrant Spouses
Under the Violence Against Women Act
A second procedure states may draw from is the system created
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow bat-
tered immigrant spouses to self-petition for adjustments to their resi-
dency status.199 The Immigration Act of 1990200 created a "battered
spouse waiver" that was designed to allow battered immigrant women
with conditional residency to receive permanent residency without the
sponsorship of their abusive husbands if they could show that they or
their children had been "battered by or ... the subject of extreme
cruelty perpetrated by" their husbands.201 Regulations promulgated
in 1991 by the INS to interpret this provision included an expansive
definition of domestic violence 202 but imposed very exacting eviden-
tiary requirements on claimants: While the regulations allowed the
INS to receive any evidence of physical abuse,2°3 they preferred and
assigned weight to "expert testimony" and documentary proof from
state agencies. 2°4 Claims of extreme cruelty had to be accompanied
by an affidavit from a licensed mental health professional.20 5 How-
ever, this emphasis on expert testimony and evidence from govern-
mental and quasi-governmental agencies proved to be unworkable.20 6
199 Federal regulations implementing self-petitioning procedures are instructive for
states primarily because they are the product of experimentation with varied evidentiary
standards. States' decisions about what constitutes acceptable evidence will be one of their
principal means of determining how many exceptions they will give. See infra note 228 and
accompanying text.
200 Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
201 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (1994).
202 "Battered" or "subject to extreme cruelty" was defined as including, but not limited
to,
being the victim of any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful
detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental injury.
Psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape, molestation, in-
cest (if the victim is a minor) or forced prostitution shall be considered acts of
violence.
8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i) (1997). While it is expansive and not exclusive, this definition has
been criticized for not explicitly including neglect and deprivation. See Felicia E. Franco,
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, 11 Berkeley Women's L.J. 99,
113 (1996).
203 See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iii) (stating that "[e]vidence of physical abuse may in-
clude, but is not limited to expert testimony").
204 See id. (listing possible evidence as "reports and affidavits from police, judges, medi-
cal personnel, school officials and social service agency personnel").
205 See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv), (vii).
06 See Franco, supra note 202, at 128-29 (noting that many women prefer to turn to
alternative sources of support); Sandra D. Pressman, The Legal Issues Confronting Condi-
tional Resident Aliens Who Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Past, Present, and Future
Perspectives, 6 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 129, 143 (1994-95) (noting hurdles as reluc-
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In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act2'w
(VAWA). One section of VAWA allows battered immigrants to self-
petition either for an initial residency classification or for uncondi-
tional permanent resident status without having to rely on their abu-
sive partners to sponsor them through a joint petition. s In light of
VAWA, the INS has recently promulgated new and improved regula-
tions regarding evidentiary standards to be employed in evaluating
claims of battery and extreme cruelty.2° 9 The regulations indicate that
credible evidence of abuse includes not only the reports and affidavits
of "state actors" (including police, judges, medical personnel, school
officials, clergy, and social service agency personnel) and official docu-
ments (such as orders of protection and documents relating to legal
actions taken against the abuser),2 10 but also evidence that the peti-
tioner sought refuge in a battered women's shelter, photographs of
injuries, and affidavits from any parties with knowledge of the
abuse.21'
C. A Proposal for Implementing an Exception to Time Limits for
Survivors of Domestic Violence
1. Publicize Availability of Exception and Encourage Applications
The first step in creating an effective regime is to ensure that wel-
fare recipients know that an exception to time limits is available to
survivors of domestic violence and to inform them of what they need
to do to receive one.2 12 For example, information on the availability
of and general requirements for an exception could be distributed
tance to confide in "outsiders," confidentiality concerns, and access-financial and linguis-
tic-to professionals); Tlen-Li Loke, Note, Trapped in Domestic Violence: The Impact of
United States Immigration Laws on Battered Immigrant Women, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. LJ. 589,
598-99 (1997) (critiquing 1991 INS regulations).
207 Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703,108 Stat. 1796, 1902-1955 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
208 See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv) (1994) (allowing spouse or child of U.S. citizen
to self-petition for classification as immediate relative).
29 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (1998) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 9, 1998; 63 Fed. Reg.
11,550).
210 See id. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv).
211 See id. While this language does not preclude the INS from granting a petition based
on a single affidavit from the petitioner herself, in their proposal form, these regulations
provided that "[t]he Service is not precluded from deciding... that the self-petitioner's
unsupported affidavit is credible and that it provides relevant evidence of sufficient weight
to meet the self-petitioner's burden of proof." Petition to Classify Alien as Immediate
Relative of a United States Citizen or as a Preference Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Cer-
tain Battered or Abused Spouses and Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,066 (1996) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 204, 205 & 216) (proposed Mar. 26, 1996).
212 The 60-month limit on benefits has been a heavily publicized aspect of the new re-
gime. While it is fair to assume that most benefit recipients are aware of at least the major
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along with benefit checks. The state welfare agency's efforts must be
sufficient to break through the isolating shield that often surrounds
violent homes and relationships. This may require action in addition
to mailings, such as personal contact between case workers and wel-
fare recipients.213
States should focus these efforts particularly on families who are
nearing the sixty-month limit, perhaps starting around the forty-eighth
month. Potential applicants must have sufficient time and opportunity
to assess the likelihood of needing such an extension and to begin to
gather evidence to support their application.214 For families receiving
their fifty-eighth and fifty-ninth months of benefits, the state welfare
agency should provide written notice, perhaps modeled on that pro-
vided for in the good cause exception, 215 explaining that their benefits
will be terminated soon, that an exception is available, and how to
take advantage of that exception.
2. Provide Confidentiality Guarantees to Applicants
When a mother reveals that there is violence in her home, she
opens herself to several risks. The violence may escalate if her abuser
learns that she is seeking help. Also, if her children are being abused
by her partner as well, as is likely in many cases, 216 she could be open-
ing herself to liability for not shielding them from abuse.217 Thus, the
features of welfare reform, it is incumbent on states to notify welfare recipients of all the
features of their new welfare programs, including both the limitations and exceptions.
213 Under the Family Violence Option states are advised to identify violent homes. See
Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1997). A state
should make particular efforts to communicate information about the exception to families
so identified.
214 Sufficient advance notice may allow an applicant not only to gather records sur-
rounding her prior reports of abuse, but also to generate evidence-by seeking the help of
legal or social service agencies, by reporting injuries and collecting medical documentation,
or even by informing others of her situation so that they will be able to corroborate her
story.
215 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216 See Panel on Research on Violence Against Women, supra note 154, at 84-85 (citing
studies indicating that three million children are exposed to battering each year and there-
fore are at risk of physical or sexual abuse, and emotional and behavioral problems).
217 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social
Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for the Acts of Others, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 13, 26 (1995) (noting that mothers may be subject to criminal or civil liability
for not preventing abuse); V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws'
Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 229,236-
38 (1996) (discussing "failure to protect" doctrine); Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The
Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Their Male Part-
ner's Abuse, 6 Hastings Women's LJ. 67, 90-91 (1995) (recognizing that fear of legal action
is factor encouraging silence in face of abuse); Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the
Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 Fain. L.Q. 273, 294-99 (1995)
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uses to which information an applicant provides can be put will be a
significant factor affecting the willingness of women to self-identify as
eligible recipients of an exception to welfare time limits.218
In general, the Personal Responsibility Act allows states to fash-
ion their own rules concerning the disclosure of information about
benefit recipients 219 The Family Violence Option and the proposed
HHS rule, however, both call for states to maintain the confidentiality
of individuals who have been identified as having histories of domestic
violence. 2 °0 States should adopt this approach and provide a clear
policy on confidentiality in order to ensure that an exception designed
to assist families will not become a vehicle for separating mothers
from their children as well.2 1 Such a policy should guarantee that
(discussing application of confidentiality laws to battered vomen and relation to child
abuse reporting requirements).
218 Indeed, the good cause exception procedures did not make confidentiality promises
explicit, which may have dissuaded petitioners. See supra note 190.
219 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(1)(A)(iv) (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring states to "[t]ake such reasonable steps as the State deems necessary to restrict
the use and disclosure of information about individuals and families receiving assistance").
Under the AFDC regime, there was a "shield of confidentiality over information regarding
AFDC applicants and recipients." Wisconsin ex rel. Dombrowski v. Moser, 334 N.W.2d
878, 880 (Wis. 1983). The AFDC statute, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1994). amended by Per-
sonal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (West Supp. 1997), and its corresponding fed-
eral regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1997), allowed states to disclose information about
benefit recipients only for limited purposes. See id. § 205.50(a)(1)(i). These purposes
included:
[t]he administration of the plan... [such as] establishing eligibility, determin-
ing the amount of assistance, and providing services for applicants and recipi-
ents[,] .... [a]ny investigation, prosecution, or criminal or civil proceeding
conducted in connection with the [welfare plan,].... [and t]he reporting to the
appropriate agency or official of information on known or suspected instances
of physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treat-
ment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid under circumstances which indi-
cate that the child's health or welfare is threatened.
Id § 205.50(a)(1)(i)(A)-(B), (G).
220 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (a)(7)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1997);
see also Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed Rule, 62
Fed. Reg. 62,124,62,128 (1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 270-75) (proposed Nov. 20,
1997) ("[W]e also encourage States to pay special attention to the need for maintaining the
confidentiality of case-record information and the victims' own assessments of their safety
needs and their abilities to meet program requirements."). But cf. NOW LDEF Sample
Comment, supra note 80, at 3 (noting that call for confidentiality in preamble to proposed
rule was not incorporated in rule itself and urging final rule to include confidentiality pro-
tections in their definition of "good cause domestic violence waiver").
21 For an example of a potential confidentiality policy, see NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Model Language for New York State Legislation Implementing the Fam-
ily Violence Option under TANF (1997) [hereinafter NOW LDEF Model Language] (on
file with the New York University Law Review). The policy states:
This information shall be used by the state agency solely for the purpose of
referral to services [including shelter, medicine, legal counseling, mental health
care, support groups, and financial assistance] or determining eligibility for
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petitioners will not be subjecting themselves to custody battles with
the state or to civil or criminal charges of failure to protect their chil-
dren.22 2 However, states that offer confidentiality should require that
those who do receive an exception participate in programs specially
designed to help survivors of violence move towards safety and work-
readiness.
3. Create Simple Application Procedures and Admit Evidence
Freely
States should spell out in detail what information they require for
a successful application and the time frame for filing for an exception.
States should be generous in setting such time limits. For example, if
an abused woman enters a job immediately upon exhausting her sixty
months of benefits, it may take her months to realize that she is not
yet capable of long-term employment because of prior or continuing
abuse. Thus, allowing the petitioner to apply for a waiver of time lim-
its for up to one year after benefits have been terminated, with exten-
sions as needed, would give her a reasonable amount of time to assess
her situation and the necessity of an exception.
An informal,223 "paper-based" application, where a petitioner
presents her case through affidavits and other documents instead of
through personal testimony, is preferable from all perspectives be-
cause it is less intimidating for a petitioner and easier for administra-
tors to evaluate. 224 The good cause exception and VAWA's self-
petitioning procedures demonstrate the advisability of this course,
since both rely on paper-based applications. 225
In implementing exceptions to welfare time limits for survivors of
violence, states should set a low evidentiary hurdle, akin to a prepon-
waivers .... Information with respect to victims of domestic violence,., shall
not be released to any outside party or parties or other governmental agencies,
unless the information is required to be disclosed by law .... This includes but
is not limited to information on the applicant or recipient's current address,
workplace or work placement, that the individual has been identified as the
victim of domestic violence or any details concerning the domestic violence.
Id. at 4.
2 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
3 Requiring formal pleadings with legalistic wording would be impractical.
224 For example, administrators will have the entire application in front of them at once,
without having to wait for witnesses. State agencies, however, may want to reserve the
possibility of speaking with the applicant directly in some circumstances.
M See supra note 193 (listing records and affidavits constituting acceptable evidence for
good cause exception); supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (describing acceptable
evidence for self-filed petitions).
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derance of the evidence standard,22 and allow a wide range of accept-
able evidence. The evolution of the VAWA regulations suggests that
stricter evidentiary requirements prevent many battered women from
successfully documenting their abuse, thereby denying them desper-
ately needed assistance because of the lack of "official" proofL 7 Fur-
ther, the mark of a state's commitment to providing exceptions for
survivors of violence will be the number of exceptions it grants. Pub-
licity and ease of application will mean little if a state holds the peti-
tioner to such a high burden of proof as to achieve the result of
actually granting very few exceptions A state therefore must cre-
ate procedures that will serve its interests both in protecting survivors
of abuse and in identifying and dismissing fraudulent applications.
Limiting the category of credible proof to documents from state
actors (such as court documents or police reports) would fail to recog-
nize that many women do not turn to such actors for relief." 9 Some
confide in no one at all. Therefore, states should provide petitioners
with a detailed, yet open ended list of acceptable evidence of abuse23~0
The regulations implementing both the good cause exception3 1 and
the self-petitioning procedures2 2 are viable examples. Such a list
could include court papers (orders of protection and other legal ac-
tions taken against the abuser), medical records, police files, records
of social service agencies (including shelters), psychologists' files,
school records, photographs of injuries, and affidavits from commu-
nity and religious leaders, neighbors, family, friends, and the peti-
tioner herself.
226 In general, there are three formal burdens of proof. "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
"by clear, strong and convincing evidence," and "by a preponderance of evidence." 2
Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 339, at 437-38 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992) (citations omitted). "Preponderance of the evidence" is defined as proof
which leads the factfinder to find the existence of the contested fact to be more probable
than its nonexistence. See id. at 439.
227 See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
228 States frequently use evidentiary standards to encourage and reward favored claims
and discourage disfavored claims. See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 647, 670 (1994) (discussing ways of disfavoring claims).
229 See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing inaccessibility of official actors
for many survivors of domestic violence).
230 It is important to provide applicants with a detailed list because such a list may give
them direction regarding what evidence to collect. An "any credible evidence" rule, while
all-inclusive, would not provide applicants with ideas.
231 See 45 C.F.R. § 232.40(c)(1)(i)-(iii) (1997).
232 See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(H) (1994) (creating self-petitioning procedures for bat-
tered immigrant women, listing examples of acceptable evidence of abuse, and calling for
all credible evidence); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (1998) (West, WESTLAV
through Mar. 9, 1998; 63 Fed. Reg. 11,550) (listing acceptable evidence of abuse).
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Situations where a petitioner's only evidence of abuse is her un-
corroborated affidavit obviously will be problematic for states because
of the increased possibility of fabrication and fraud. While states
could refuse wholesale to accept uncorroborated allegations of vio-
lence, such a policy effectively would ignore the isolating nature of
domestic violence. Three other options are available. First, the state
could adopt the method used by the good cause exception: to seek to
corroborate the affidavit by contacting the alleged abuser.233 Such a
policy, however, would violate confidentiality requirements23 4 and po-
tentially imperil the safety of the applicant. A second, less trouble-
some option would be for the state agency to evaluate an
uncorroborated affidavit and, if it has a ring of authenticity, to inter-
view the petitioner personally to judge her credibility. A third option
would be to adopt a rule that an uncorroborated affidavit is sufficient
evidence of abuse to warrant an exception absent any independent
reason to find it not credible23 5
At first glance, concerns about fraud might argue against the
third option. However, fear that benefit recipients seeking a "free
ride" will file a substantial number of fraudulent applications should
not yet unduly influence the systems states create. While states obvi-
ously have no experience in this precise area, studies indicate that the
number of fraudulent AFDC applications was low23 6 and that allega-
tions of abuse in child custody disputes, where the stakes are quite
high, are rarely deliberately false.237 Given that states retain the dis-
233 See supra note 194 and accompanying text (describing policy of contacting putative
abuser/father to verify uncorroborated claim).
2M See supra Part III.C.2.
235 See, e.g., NOW LDEF Model Language, supra note 221, at 7 (providing that
"[a]Ilegations of domestic violence by a victim shall be sufficient to establish domestic vio-
lence where the agency has no independent, reasonable basis to find the recipient not
credible"); see also supra note 211 (noting that new INS regulations on self-petitioning
procedures do not preclude granting petitions based on single affidavit of petitioner).
236 For example, the state of California estimated that only 9.4% of AFDC cases in-
volved errors. "Error" included not only fraud, but also welfare department mistakes and
honest client errors. See Stephen Bingham, Replace Welfare for Contingent Workers with
Unemployment Compensation, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 937, 938 n.7 (1995) (citing State De-
partment of Social Services, AFDC Quality Control Corrective Action Plan: Oct. 1990-
Sept. 1991).
237 Although generally they are viewed with great suspicion, allegations of child abuse
made during custody disputes are actually rare. See Nancy Thoennes & Jessica Pearson,
Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations Project, in Sexual Abuse Allega-
tions in Custody and Visitation Cases: A Recourse Book for Judges and Court Personnel
1, 4 (E. Bruce Nicholson & Josephine Bulkley eds., A.B.A. 1988) (concluding that sexual
abuse allegations are likely to occur in 2 to 15 of every 1000 divorces). When such allega-
tions are made, they typically are made in good faith. See id. at 20-21 (finding that only
15% of 160 cases of alleged child sexual abuse were deliberately false).
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cretion to reevaluate and alter their system for exceptions, they ini-
tially should not shape their systems around unfounded suspicion.
4. Expedite Decisionmaking and Provide for Limited Review
Petitioners whose applications are denied face an almost immedi-
ate loss of income. Therefore, states should evaluate applications for
exceptions at a relatively rapid pace and inform applicants of the out-
come of their petitions quickly. Ideally, states should attempt to reach
their decisions within ten to fourteen days. Of course, some applica-
tions may take longer to evaluate.P 8 For example, if the state agency
wishes to interview an applicant who submitted a credible but uncor-
roborated affidavit, two weeks likely will be too short a period.
States also should develop some sort of formal review process.
Here, states should deviate from the good cause exception model, as it
provided only for intra-agency review of decisions favorable to the
petitionerP 9 Because the denial of an exception to welfare time lim-
its will have a massive impact on the petitioner's family, states should
create at least an intra-agency process for appeal and review for peti-
tioners whose applications are denied.2 4°
5. Schedule Evaluation in 2003
The earliest date on which states could receive block grants and
assume administration of their own welfare programs was July 1,
1997.241 Therefore, the earliest possible date on which a welfare recip-
ient could reach her benefit limit and therefore be eligible for an ex-
ception is July 1, 2002.
238 Nevertheless, the 45-day response time mandated by the good cause exception regu-
lations, see 45 C.F.R. § 232.41(c) (1997), seems too prolonged.
239 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
240 Establishing a process of appeal is particularly important because experience under
AFDC shows that most denials of welfare benefits were reversed after a fair hearing. See
Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that "[m]ost AFDC families vin their
hearings" and recalling that in 1983,75% of New York City families prevailed in fair bear-
ings).
Again, although due process concerns also are implicated by an appeal process, see
supra note 182, it is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in depth the potential impact
of the Due Process Clause on applications for exceptions for survivors of violence. See id.
For a proposal incorporating the constitutionally required fair hearing process established
by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), see NOW LDEF Model Language, supra note
221, at 6-7 ("Denials of requests for waivers... shall be in writing and shall state the
reason for denial.... Such denials may be appealed through the fair hearing procedure
applicable to other determinations of TANF eligibility, progress or status.").
241 See Personal Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 note (West Supp. 1997) (setting
transition date at later of either July 1, 1997 or six months after submission of state plan to
Secretary of Health and Human Services).
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Critics of the relaxed standards proposed above may claim that
an exception so conceived will invite present benefit recipients to
continue in a lifestyle of dependency under the assumption that they
will be able to petition successfully for an exception in sixty months.
However, the availability of exceptions does not exist in a vacuum. In
the next five years, states will be experimenting with and implement-
ing myriad programs to end dependency, identify and assist families
destroyed by violence, and prepare today's welfare recipients for edu-
cation and work. If the states have the success envisioned by the Per-
sonal Responsibility Act, there should be little need for exceptions.
In the experimental spirit of the Personal Responsibility Act, it
seems appropriate that states choosing to implement an exception to
welfare time limits for survivors of violence modeled on the proposals
of this Note commit to evaluating whether a system so implemented
actually has achieved its intended effects. It would be appropriate for
states to engage in such an evaluation after at least a year of imple-
mentation and observation, in 2003.
CONCLUSION
In this time of welfare reform, states must balance programs that
transition benefit recipients into the workplace with programs that
provide support for those who cannot yet become independent, such
as those trapped in the cycle of domestic violence. The Personal Re-
sponsibility Act established a sixty-month cap on benefits on the view
that time-limited welfare benefits will encourage self-sufficiency. This
Note contends that, whatever the effect of such a cap generally, it will
cause great harm to survivors of domestic violence because of their
diminished capacity to enter the workforce successfully. It examines
arguments-grounded in the Personal Responsibility Act and in pol-
icy-supporting and opposing the creation of an exception for survi-
vors of domestic violence and concludes that states can and should
implement an exception to time limits. Drawing from AFDC regula-
tions implementing a good cause exception to paternity cooperation
requirements and VAWA's self-petitioning procedures for battered
immigrant women, this Note proposes that states create an exception
regime characterized by the encouragement of applications, confiden-
tiality guarantees to applicants, simple application procedures and low
standards of proof, broad categories of admissible evidence, expedited
decisionmaking, and availability of review. Such a regime should be
but one of the ways in which states manifest a concrete commitment
to survivors of domestic violence. The ultimate goal, of course, is the
creation of a society in which families can live healthy, whole lives,
free from the specters of poverty and violence.
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